The Information Content of Standard & Poor\u27s Common Stock Ranking Changes by Felton, James




The Information Content of Standard & Poor's
Common Stock Ranking Changes
James Felton
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd
Part of the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by
an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Recommended Citation
Felton, James, "The Information Content of Standard & Poor's Common Stock Ranking Changes" (1990). Theses and Dissertations.
2997.
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/2997
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF STANDARD & POOR'S
COMMON STOCK RANKING CHANGES
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF STANDARD & POOR'S
COMMON STOCK RANKING CHANGES
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
By
JAMES MARTIN FELTON, B.S., M.A. 
Arkansas Tech University, 1981 
University of Arkansas, 1983
December 1990 
University of Arkansas
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithou t permission.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents. Their 
love and support have always been invaluable to me.
It has been a privilege to work with my dissertation 
committee chairman, Dr. Pu Liu. He has patiently guided me 
through the steps of the research process.
I wish to express my thanks to Dr. Douglas Hearth, Dr. 
Thomas McKinnon, Dr. Joe Jones, Dr. Colm O'Cinneide, and Dr. 
Robert Kennedy for their helpful comments. I am also grate­
ful for the cooperation of Carl Ratner of the Standard & 
Poor's Corporation.
iii
Reproduced with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ...........................  1
1.1 Introduction and statement of Purpose ............  1
1.2 Basis and Significance of the Problem............  6
1.3 Limitations of the Study ......................... 10
1.4 Remainder of the Study ..........................  11
CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE .................  13
2.1 Introduction ....................................  13
2.2 Standard & Poor's Common Stock Rankings ........... 13
2.3 Value Line Investment Survey Common Stock Rankings . 19
2.4 Summary of Related Literature ...................  32
CHAPTER THREE: THE METHODOLOGY ......................  37
3.1 Introduction ....................................  37
3.2 The Event Study Methodology .....................  37
3.2.1 Measurement of Abnormal Returns .................  37
3.2.2 The Test Statistic ............................  40
3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Procedures .............. 41
3.3.1 Period of Study ...............................  41
3.3.2 Sample Selection Procedure ..................... 42
CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL RESULTS ...................... 47
4.1 Introduction ....................................  47
4.2 Information Content at the Memorandum Dates:
Upgrades ........................................  48
4.3 Information Content at the Memorandum Dates:
Downgrades ......................................  53
4.4 Abnormal Returns and Firm Size...................  57
4.5 The Initiation and Withdrawal of a Ranking ........ 58
4.6 Risk and Return Characteristics of Rankings ....... 61
4.7 Summary of Empirical Results ..................... 65
iv
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 101
5.1 Introduction ....................................  101
5.2 Objective of Dissertation .......................  101
5.3 Research Methodology ............................  103
5.4 Summary and Contribution of Empirical Findings ..... 104
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research ...............  106
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 107
Appendix A: Description of the Standard & Poor's
Common Stock Rankings .................... 110
Appendix B: Description of the Moody's, Value Line, and
Financial World Common Stock Rankings ..... 112
Appendix C: The Market Model ........................ 115
Appendix D: Market Adjusted Returns ..................  116
Within-Class Upgrades .................... 117
Across-Class Upgrades ............   118
All Upgrades ............................  119
Within-Class Downgrades .................. 120
Across-Class Downgrades .................. 121
All Downgrades ..........................  122
v
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Standard & Poor's rankings for common stocks ..... 12
2.1 Haugen [1979] results ........................... 33
2.2 Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983] results .......  34
2.3 Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983] results .......  35
2.4 Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1984] results .......  36
3.1 Population of ranking changes by category ........  44
3.2 Transition matrix of common stock ranking changes . 45
3.3 Sample of common stock ranking changes by category 46
4.1 Daily AARs for A to A+ ........................  67
4.2 Daily AARs for A- to A ......................... 68
4.3 Daily AARs for B to B+ ......................... 69
4.4 Daily AARs for B- to B ......................... 70
4.5 Daily AARs for Within-Class Upgrades ...... 71
4.6 Daily AARs for B+ to A-  ...............  72
4.7 Daily AARs for C to B- ......................... 73
4.8 Daily AARs for Across-Class Upgrades .......  74
4.9 Daily AARs for All Upgrades ..............  75
4.10 Confounding events for upgrades .................  76
4.11 Daily AARs for A+ to A ....    77
4.12 Daily AARs for A to A- ......................... 78
4.13 Daily AARs for B+ to B ......................... 79
4.14 Daily AARs for B to B- ......................... 80
4.15 Daily AARs for Within-Class Downgrades ....  81
4.16 Daily AARs for A- to B+ ......................... 82
4.17 Daily AARs for B- to C ......................... 83
4.18 Daily AARs for C to D ......................... 84
4.19 Daily AARs for Across-Class Downgrades ....  85
4.20 Daily AARs for All Downgrades ............. 86
4.21 Confounding events for downgrades ...............  87
4.22 Tests for firm-size effect on AARs of upgrades .... 88
4.23 Tests for firm-size effect on AARs of downgrades .. 89
4.24 Daily AARs for Ranking to NR .............. 90
4.25 Daily AARs for NR to High Ranking ......... 91
4.26 Daily AARs for NR to Low Ranking.......... 92
4.27 Daily AARs for NR to Ranking .............. 93
4.28 Return and standard deviation for NR portfolios ... 94
4.29 Test for change in mean beta for NR portfolios .... 95
4.30 Sample of Ranking to NR portfolio ...............  96
4.31 Return and standard deviation for rankings ....... 97
4.32 Test for change in mean beta for upgrades ........ 98
4.33 Test for change in mean beta for downgrades...... 99
4.34 Mean betas by category .......................... 100
vi
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction and Statement of Purpose
The Standard & Poor's Corporation is one of the largest 
investment advisory services in the United States. Standard 
& Poor's provides extensive financial information on common 
stocks, including common stock rankings.1 These rankings 
are derived from a system that begins with a computer­
generated score for per-share growth, stability, and 
cyclicality of earnings and dividends for the most recent 
ten years of available data. Standard & Poor's then makes 
adjustments to the computer-generated scores based on 
corporate size and sales volume. Finally, the scores are 
reviewed and modified by Standard & Poor's for relative 
current standing and special considerations (such as natural 
disasters, strikes, and non-recurring accounting adjust­
ments) . Many companies' stocks are not ranked due to 
insufficient data. Also, standard & Poor's does not rank 
the stocks of foreign companies, investment companies, and
1 Common stock rankings are also published in the 
Moody's Handbook of Common Stocks, the Value Line Investment 
Survey. and the Financial World. See Appendix A for a more 
detailed description of the Standard & Poor's common stock 
rankings, and see Appendix B for descriptions of the 
Moody's, Value Line, and Financial World common stock 
rankings.
1
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certain finance-oriented companies. Unranked stocks are 
denoted NR (no ranking). The rankings are published monthly 
in the Stock Guide, quarterly in the three editions (New 
York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, and Over-the- 
Counter) of the Standard & Poor's Stock Reports, and 
annually in the Standard & Poor's Stock Market Encyclopedia. 
Table 1.1 lists the eight rankings used by Standard &
Poor's.
There is some discrepancy by Standard & Poor's 
concerning the purpose of the common stock rankings. On 
one hand, Standard & Poor's offers the following disclaimer 
rStock Guide, p. 7]:
A ranking is not a forecast of future market 
performance, but is basically an appraisal of past 
performance of earnings and dividends, and relative 
current standing. These rankings must not be used 
as market recommendations; a high-score stock may 
at times be so overpriced as to justify its sale, 
while a low-score stock may be attractively priced 
for purchase.
Conversely, Standard & Poor's implies a relation between 
common stock prices and common stock rankings in the 
following statements rStandard & Poor's Stock Reports, pp. 
ix-x; Stock Guide, p. 7]s
We believe that the two most important fac­
tors in determining the price of a stock are 
earnings and dividend growth. It is this growth 
that will most likely cause stock prices to rise 
over time. Earnings growth is important because
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
3
it allows a company to pay higher dividends and 
these increasing dividends help offset the effects 
of inflation....
Growth and stability of earnings and dividends 
are deemed key elements in establishing Standard & 
Poor's earnings and dividend rankings for common 
stocks, which are designed to capsulize the nature 
of this record in a single symbol.
Additionally, Carl Ratner, the publisher of the Stock Guide 
and a Vice-President of Standard & Poor's, suggests that 
"common stocks ranked A- may be the most interesting 
securities to hold for price appreciation.1,2
Although Standard & Poor's common stock rankings are 
not purported to be specific buy or sell recommendations 
with predictions of share price movement (as with the Value 
Line investment Survey and numerous investment news 
letters), the rankings do incorporate information provided 
by Standard & Poor's on which investors may base investment 
decisions. While early studies by Stevenson [1966] and 
Soldofsky [1968] question the usefulness of Standard &
Poor’s common stock rankings, more recent studies find that 
the rankings provide investors with information. Haugen 
[1979], Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983, 1984], and Muller 
and Fielitz [1987] conclude that the rankings are closely 
related to risk as measured by beta and the variability of 
returns and earnings. Haugen [1979] finds that risk rises 
for each ranking from A+ to C, while Muller, Fielitz, and
2 Telephone interview, September 26, 1988.
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Greene [1983, 1984] and Muller and Fielitz [1987] find that 
risk rises for each ranking from A+ to B.3 While the 
rankings are found to be a good measure of risk, they are 
not found to be a reliable measure of return. Muller and 
Fielitz [1987] suggest that a buy and hold strategy of 
stocks ranked A is the best method for receiving high risk- 
adjusted portfolio returns.
Standard & Poor's makes common stock ranking changes 
daily. A ranking change can be either an upgrade, a down­
grade, the initiation of a ranking (from NR to a ranking), 
or the withdrawal of a ranking (from a ranking to NR) /
The ranking changes are initially revealed by Standard 
& Poor's via internal memoranda. The memoranda are 
generated in the following manner: Information is processed
daily by Standard & Poor's, and the new data is entered into 
the scoring system described previously for common stock 
rankings. The new information usually causes a few 
companies' stocks to have proposed ranking changes. Each 
company with a proposed ranking change is listed on the 
memorandum. Next, standard & Poor's reviews the list of 
companies and decides which companies will retain their
3 Due to insufficient data, Haugen [1979] excludes 
stocks ranked D from his study, and Muller, Fielitz, and 
Greene [1983, 1984] and Muller and Fielitz [1987] exclude 
stocks ranked lower than B.
4 An additional category involves liquidated companies 
(from a ranking to Liq). This type of change will not be 
considered in this paper since such changes occur approxi­
mately only twice per year.
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current rankings, and which companies will change to the 
proposed rankings. Approximately forty percent of the 
companies listed on the memoranda have a ranking change, 
while the remainder of the companies retain their current 
rankings.5
The memoranda are released daily (mailed as hard-copy) 
to the Interactive Data Corporation, a time-share service in 
Boston, which then provides the information to its 
customers.6 The ranking changes are subsequently published 
at the end of the month in the Stock Guide.7
The circulation of the Stock Guide is approximately 
400,000 per month. In addition to subscribers, the Stock 
Guide is also available to most investors who employ a full- 
service broker. Common stock rankings are published in the 
Stock Guide among other financial data (such as ratio 
analysis, shares of institutional holdings, monthly volume 
of trades, dividend yield, and share price history) for more 
than 5,300 common and preferred stocks.
5 Standard & Poor's proposed 4,452 ranking changes 
during the period from June 1985 to May 1987. Of these 
proposed changes, 2,573 (58%) retained their current 
rankings, while 1,879 (42%) received the proposed ranking 
change.
6 The Interactive Data corporation will not release any 
information regarding how quickly the information is made 
available to their customers.
7 The ranking changes are listed in two places in the 
Stock Guide each month. A special section on page four 
contains all changes for that month, and each change is also 
printed with its corresponding company.
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The purpose of this study is to determine the extent to 
which common stock ranking changes made by Standard & Poor's 
affect common stock prices. That is, this study is an 
empirical test of the information content of common stock 
ranking changes made by Standard & Poor's.
1.2 Basis and Significance of the Problem
This study attempts to answer several questions 
regarding Standard & Poor's common stock ranking changes.
The central question is whether or not the ranking changes 
contain information which is not already incorporated in 
security prices, since previous studies find information 
content in Standard & Poor's common stock rankings, the a 
priori expectation is that the ranking changes contain 
information, although, following Stickel [1986], an argument 
can be presented for both sides of the issue.
On one hand, there is good reason to expect a security 
price response to common stock ranking changes. Standard & 
Poor's lengthy history of publication coupled with their 
large current readership suggest that market participants 
consider them to be important producers of information. The 
ranking changes assimilate publicly available information, 
and they may also encompass non-publicly available infor­
mation to which Standard & Poor’s has access. If the
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ranking changes are based in part on valuable, non-publicly 
available information, then a security price response would 
be expected upon their release. Also, the ranking changes 
may affect security prices even if they are based only on 
publicly available information.
Millon and Thakor [1985] provide theoretical 
justification for the existence of information gathering 
agencies such as Standard & Poor's and Value Line. They 
argue that it is more economical for information gathering 
agencies to share information with individuals than to have 
individuals process their own information. Stickel [1986, 
p. 199] concurs with Millon and Thakor [1985], and he makes 
the following argument in the case of preferred stock rating 
changes:
Even if the rating changes are entirely based 
on publicly available information they may affect 
prices if investors believe their individual 
marginal costs of gathering and processing infor­
mation are greater than their individual expected 
marginal benefits. The agencies may be efficient 
processors of costly, publicly available informa­
tion, who periodically rate the financial strength 
of companies for their subscribers. The disclo­
sure of this processed information would be 'new* 
information to the marketplace, affecting security 
prices.
On the other hand, there is reason to expect that the 
ranking changes have no information content. The ranking 
changes may be made subsequent to the release of publicly 
available information, and they may be mere summary
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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statistics which provide financial markets with no 
additional information.
While the information content of common stock ranking 
changes made by Standard & Poor's has not been previously 
tested, a closely related area, the information content of 
Value Line recommendations, has been examined extensively. 
Performance evaluation studies by Black [1971], Holloway 
[1981], and Copeland and Mayers [1982] find that stocks 
ranked high in the Value Line Investment Survey outperform 
stocks ranked low, even after making an adjustment for 
market risk. Since Value Line's rankings are based almost 
entirely on publicly available information, the rankings' 
ability to predict abnormal stock market performance is 
considered anomalous to capital market efficiency. Stickel 
[1985] tests for information content in Value Line ranking 
changes. He examines 1,427 weekly Value Line (timeliness) 
ranking changes during the 191 week period from July 16,
1976 to March 7, 1980. Information content is found for 
Value Line ranking changes, and the portfolio price 
adjustment is for approximately three days subsequent to the 
public release of the ranking changes. Stickel [1985] finds 
that stocks reclassified from rank 2 to rank 1 have the most 
pronounced effect on common stock prices.
If Standard & Poor's ranking changes have information 
content, then they should affect security prices upon their 
announcement. On the memorandum dates, the ranking changes
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contain "privileged" information that has not yet been 
released to the public. The first release to the public is 
through the Interactive Data Corporation. If the ranking 
changes do contain new information, and the customers of the 
Interactive Data corporation trade based on the ranking 
changes, then a security price response would be expected 
two to three days after the memorandum dates.
The second public release of the ranking changes occurs 
when the Stock Guide is published. If the information is 
already fully "impounded" in stock prices due to the 
previous release, then no market reaction would be expected 
from the publication of the Stock Guide. However, if the 
ranking changes contain information which is not fully 
incorporated from the first release, and subscribers of the 
Stock Guide buy and sell common stocks based on the ranking 
changes, then a market response would be expected when the 
Stock Guide is published.
Conversely, if the ranking changes contain no new 
information, then there would be no market response due to 
their release, but there may be a change in stock prices 
prior to the memorandum dates. A movement of stock prices 
prior to the memorandum dates would indicate that the 
ranking changes are only summary statistics with no 
information content per se.
Empirical results reported in Chapter IV indicate that 
common stock returns change significantly prior to memoranda
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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dates, for both upgrades and downgrades. However, the 
adjustment process differs by type of ranking change, and a 
statistically significant rise in stock prices occurs six 
days after the memorandum date for upgrades. Based on the 
results of a Wall Street Journal Index search, Standard & 
Poor's makes ranking changes subsequent to earnings 
announcements. While no relation is found between rankings 
and return, a close relation is found between rankings and 
risk, both before and after ranking changes. Also, a 
statistically significant fall in the mean beta for upgrades 
is found following the memorandum date. Firms upgraded by 
Standard & Poor's are found to have a reduction in risk 
subsequent to a ranking change. Thus, while a Standard & 
Poor's anomaly does not exist, Standard & Poor's common 
stock rankings provide investors with a reliable measure of 
risk, and ranking changes indicate a change in risk.
1.3 Limitations of the Study
This study is limited in part by the unwillingness of 
the Interactive Data Corporation to describe the process by 
which it releases Standard & Poor's common stock ranking 
changes to its customers. Because of this lack of 
information, the exact date on which the data become 
available to the public is unknown. In order to account for
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithou t permission.
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this limitation, this study examines stock price behavior 
for a sufficient length of time subsequent to the memorandum 
dates to allow for the dissemination of the information.
1.4 Remainder of the Study
Chapter II provides a review of the literature related 
to common stock ranking changes. These topics include the 
information content of Standard & Poor's and Value Line 
common stock rankings, and the information content of Value 
Line ranking changes. Chapter III examines the event study 
methodology used in this paper, the period of study, and the 
sample and sample selection procedure. Chapter IV provides 
empirical results and an interpretation of the results, and 
Chapter V is a summary of the study and conclusions.
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithou t permission.
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Table l.l
Standard & Poor's rankings for common stocks. They 
are based on the growth, stability, and cyclicality 
of earnings and dividends. Adjustments are made for 
corporate size, sales volume, special considerations, 









Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
13
CHAPTER TWO 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine the information 
content of common stock ranking changes made by the Standard 
& Poor's Corporation. This chapter provides a review of 
related literature. There are previous studies in two 
related areas which provide the foundation for this paper. 
The first area involves the information content of standard 
& Poor's common stock rankings, and the second area entails 
the Value Line Investment Survey anomaly.
2.2 Standard & Poor's Common Stock Rankings
An early study by Stevenson [1966] questions the 
usefulness of common stock rankings. He suggests that 
common stock quality rankings should classify firms into 
risk classes. Rather than directly testing for common stock 
rankings' ability to measure risk, Stevenson measures the 
variability of standard & Poor's, Value Line, and Financial
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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World rankings.8 He argues that rankings should be 
consistent if they are a good measure of risk. That is, a 
company with a high ranking (indicating low risk) by one 
investment advisory service should also be ranked high by 
the other two services.
In Stevenson's random sample of 110 stocks ranked by 
the three services during 1965, none of the stocks receive 
identical rankings from the three investment services, and 
four stocks have rankings that vary by more than one grade. 
Furthermore, standard & Poor's is found to give higher 
rankings to stocks than the other two services.9 Stevenson 
attributes these differences in rankings to the services' 
different ranking criteria. While the descriptions given by 
Value Line, Standard & Poor's, and Financial World are 
fairly general, standard & Poor's seems to place relative 
emphasis on the growth of earnings and dividends. Thus, 
Stevenson justifies the higher Standard & Poor's rankings in 
1965 with the economic growth of the early 1960s. In a 
sample of 78 electric utility companies, only two stocks 
have identical rankings for the three services, with Value 
Line rankings higher than those of Standard & Poor's and
8 Stevenson [1966] studies Value Line's rankings prior 
to April 1965, when Value Line began their current 
timeliness rankings.
9 Based on a scoring system where A+=l, A=2, ..., c=8, 
the mean (standard deviation) scores are 3.709 (1.632) for 
Standard & Poor's, 4.936 (1.767) for Financial World, and 
5.082 (1.876) for Value Line.
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.
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Financial World.10 Value Line's higher rankings for 
utilities are attributed to its emphasis on past market 
price stability.
Stevenson also attempts to find factors (such as the 
price-earnings ratio, dividend yield, and change in 
earnings) which are correlated with rankings that can be 
used to classify stocks by risk. However, none of the 
correlations are large enough to suggest their influence on 
the ranking systems, and Stevenson [1966, pp. 100-101] 
reaches the following conclusion:
This investigation has not produced strong 
support for the use of common stock quality ratings 
as guides to the risk associated with any particu­
lar stock. The wide variations among the ratings 
given the stocks sampled suggests either security 
analysts have considerable difficulty classifying 
the risk inherent in a stock or, that they even 
disagree on appropriate risk criteria.... Investors 
should be aware of the different common stock qual­
ity ratings that may be given the same stock by 
different advisory services.
Soldofsky [1968] ignores Stevenson's warning and 
measures the performance of common stocks whose Standard & 
Poor's, Value Line, and Moody's rankings were identical or 
nearly identical during the entire period from 1951-1966.
He finds 75 industrial stocks that meet the criteria of his
Using the same scoring system, the mean (standard 
deviation) scores are 2.206 (0.624) for Value Line, 2.244 
(0.759) for Standard & Poor's, and 3.936 (1.188) for 
Financial World.
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screening process, and he divides the 75 stocks into five 
groups of fifteen each based on their rankings. He examines 
the correspondence which his quality groups have with both 
risk (as measured by the standard deviation of annual 
returns) and return (as measured by the mean of annual 
yields) during the fifteen-year period. Soldofsky reaches 
the conclusion that the rankings provided by investment 
advisory services do not provide investors with good 
measures of risk and return of common stocks.
Haugen [1979] finds information content in common stock 
rankings when he examines their ability to predict 
subsequent returns and risk of common stocks. He escapes 
Soldofsky's design problem by examining only Standard & 
Poor's rankings. His motivation for research stems from 
work by Cragg and Malkiel [1968], which finds evidence of 
investment advisors' inability to accurately forecast the 
relative short-term profitability of firms.
Haugen constructs seven (equally weighted) portfolios 
from the 806 New York Stock Exchange common stocks that were 
ranked either A+, A, A-, B+, B, B-, or C by Standard &
Poor's in 1956. He then examines their relative performance 
during the period from 1956-1971 without making any 
adjustments for subsequent ranking changes. That is, each 
stock remains in its initial portfolio regardless of its 
ranking after 1956. Delisted stocks are dropped from their 
portfolio the month of their delisting.
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Table 2.1 presents Haugen's findings of a perfect 
correspondence between Standard & Poor's rankings and 
portfolio risk as measured by beta. However, only a weak, 
positive relation between rankings and actual portfolio 
rates of return is found. Haugen suggests that these 
results are dependent upon the nature of general market 
performance during the period of study.
In a related study, Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983] 
also find information content in Standard & Poor's common 
stock rankings. They examine the consistency of the risk 
and return of (equally weighted) portfolios of common stocks 
ranked by Standard & Poor's during the 1970s. Their sample 
contains 20 stocks ranked A+, 28 ranked A, 24 ranked A-, 103 
ranked B+, and 57 ranked B by Standard & Poor's during the 
entire period from 1970 through 1979.11 Stocks ranked B-,
C, and D are excluded from the study since few stocks had a 
constant low ranking during the full ten-year period.
The findings of Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983] are 
presented in tables 2.2 and 2.3. They find that Standard & 
Poor's rankings are a good proxy for risk as measured by 
both beta and portfolio standard deviation, while the 
relation between portfolio risk and return is not constant 
over time. Stocks ranked A are found to have the highest
11 Standard & Poor's ranked approximately 4,400 stocks 
from 1970 to 1979. Only 325 stocks received a constant 
ranking during the ten-year period, and Muller, Fielitz, and 
Greene [1983] found complete price, dividend, and earnings 
data for 232 stocks.
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portfolio reward-to-variability ratio (mean/standard 
deviation of total returns) for the entire period, but not 
for the three subperiods tested. High-quality (A+) stocks 
performed the best in the first subperiod (12/70 to 6/73), 
medium-quality (B+) stocks performed the best in the second 
subperiod (9/73 to 6/76), and lower-quality (B) stocks 
performed the best in the third subperiod (9/76 to 6/79). 
Also, earnings stability is found to be weighted more than 
dividend stability in the determination of the rankings. 
Finally, Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983, p. 42] imply in 
the following statement that ranking changes by Standard & 
Poor's may affect stock prices:
Clearly, if portfolio managers can determine 
which stocks are currently in vogue, short-run per­
formance results can be considerably enhanced by 
favoring the "correct" type of stock. At the same 
time, changes in security quality rankings would 
have implications for portfolio buy and sell deci­
sions. Specifically, if a manager believes that 
holding high quality securities is "correct," 
stocks that drop in ranking from A+ to A or A- 
should be sold, and stocks improving in quality 
from A to At should be purchased.
In a subsequent study, Muller, Fielitz, and Greene 
[1984] examine the impact of sales, net worth, leverage, and 
return on equity on Standard & Poor's common stock rankings. 
Their sample contains 19 stocks ranked A+, 24 stocks ranked 
A, 20 stocks ranked A-, 25 stocks ranked B+, and 18 stocks 
ranked B in the years 1972, 1975, and 1978. They find that
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Standard & Poor's rankings are closely related to firm size 
(net worth and sales) and return on equity, but are not 
related to leverage. Table 2.4 contains their results.
Muller and Fielitz [1987] reconstruct the previous 
studies of Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983,1984] with data 
from September 1970 through December 1984. Muller and 
Fielitz [1987, pp. 66,67] both confirm and supplement 
previous findings of information content in Standard &
Poor's common stock rankings:
On average, the higher the growth, return on 
equity, earnings reinvestment, and size of a com­
pany, the higher the quality rank. Also, the A+ 
companies are less financially leveraged than the 
other companies....
[S]uperior risk-adjusted returns are available 
to those investors who hold portfolios of A, A-, B+ 
stocks, and, in particular, A stocks. There are 
short periods in down markets when A+ stocks do 
better than the other groups.... The most surpris­
ing feature of our results is that the superior 
performance of high-quality stocks, and A stocks in 
particular, persists over the entire fifteen-year 
period.
2.3 Value Line Investment Survey Common Stock Rankings
This section surveys the literature involving the 
unresolved debate of whether or not investors can earn 
abnormal returns by making use of Value Line's common stock 
rankings. The debate is referred to as the "Value Line 
Anomaly" since several studies find information content in
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithou t perm ission.
20
Value Line's rankings, which is a violation of the semi­
strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis.
Value Line's rankings are similar to Standard & Poor's 
rankings since both ranking systems are based almost 
entirely on publicly available information with historical 
earnings and dividend yields playing key roles. Also, both 
publications are widely circulated to investors who may 
trade stocks based on the information. However, the ranking 
systems differ significantly in their stated purpose. While 
Standard & Poor's rankings are advertised as summary 
statistics to be used by investors as only a part of a 
complete investment analysis, Value Line's rankings purport 
to provide investors with an investment strategy per se.
This study is motivated in part by the Value Line 
anomaly. While Value Line's ranking system may allow 
investors to outperform the market, this study will 
contribute to previous studies by testing whether or not 
ranking changes made by Standard & Poor's convey information 
to the market, since Value Line's ranking system offers 
specific recommendations to investors, while Standard & 
Poor's ranking system offers relatively passive advice, an a 
priori expectation of this study is that Value Line's 
rankings have a greater impact on common stock prices than 
Standard & Poor's rankings.
In April 1965, the Value Line Investment Survey began 
publishing timeliness rankings for common stocks that are
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specific buy-or-sell recommendations. Approximately 1700 
securities are ranked from 1 to 5. The lower the numerical 
rank, the greater the expected relative return for the 
security for the next twelve months. Each week 100 stocks 
are ranked 1 (highest), 300 stocks are ranked 2 (above 
average), about 900 stocks are ranked 3 (average), 300 
stocks are ranked 4 (below average), and 100 stocks are 
ranked 5 (lowest). These common stock rankings are the 
result of a filter rule which considers the relative 
earnings and price rank of each security, "price momentum," 
quarterly earnings momentum, and unexpected quarterly 
earnings. These rankings are based almost entirely on 
publicly available information, as explained by Black [1973,
p. 10]:
The rankings are based almost completely on 
ten years of published information on the earnings 
and common stock prices of the companies followed.
In order to have earnings figures covering the same 
period of time available for all companies simulta­
neously, the Value Line analysts estimate earnings 
for a particular quarter from the time the quarter 
ends until the quarterly earnings are officially 
reported. Once the rankings are produced by a com­
puter, they are edited, and may be changed, to re­
duce the magnitude and frequency of changes in rank. 
These are the only ways in which subjective judge­
ment enters into the calculation of the ranks on a 
continuing basis. The design of the ranking system 
involved some judgemental factors, but as noted, the 
inputs to the system consist almost entirely of pub­
lished information.
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The debate regarding the information content of Value 
Line's timeliness rankings began shortly after the rankings' 
inception. In an effort to promote the Value Line 
Investment Survey. Value Line announced its first contest in 
Stock Market Judgement in September 1965. Contestants were 
allowed to select 25 stocks from Value Line's timeliness 
categories 4 (below average) and 5 (lowest).12 The 
performance of the contestants' portfolios over a six-month 
period (December 3, 1965 to June 3, 1966) were to be 
compared with the performance of a portfolio formed by the 
Value Line management. Value Line selected 25 stocks from 
timeliness category l for their portfolio, and a list of 
their 25 stocks was made public before the beginning of the 
contest. The contest attracted 18,565 official entrants, 
and Value Line offered cash prizes for the highest- 
performing 104 portfolios that outperformed Value Line's 
portfolio.13
Shelton [1967] provides the first analysis of Value 
Line's 1965-1966 contest. His interest in the contest stems
12 The contestants had 350 stocks to choose from based 
on their Oct. 26, 1965 rankings. Value Line ranked 100 
stocks in Class 1 (highest), 259 in Class 2 (above average), 
363 in Class 3 (average), 250 in Class 4 (below average), 
and 100 in Class 5 (lowest) on that day.
13 The prizes offered were $5,000 for first place,
$2,500 for second place, $1,000 for third place, $500 for 
fourth place, and $100 each to the next 100 portfolios that 
outperformed Value Line's portfolio. The performance of 
each contestant was calculated based on equally-weighted 
portfolio returns with adjustments for stock splits, stock 
dividends, and other capital changes.
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from debate concerning the random walk hypothesis and the 
performance of mutual funds. His main concern is whether or 
not the contest participants are able to select portfolios 
which outperform the market. During the six-month period, 
the 350 stocks in categories 4 and 5 lost an average of 
5.96% in value, and the 18,565 contestants lost an average 
of 4.77% in the value of their portfolios.14 Thus, Shelton 
concludes that stock prices during the contest were somewhat 
predictable, rather than random, since the contestants were 
successful in their stock selection. Only twenty portfolios 
from the 18,565 entrants had higher returns than the Value 
Line portfolio for the six-month period of the contest, 
marking the beginning of the Value Line anomaly. During the 
six-month period, Value Line's portfolio of 25 stocks gained 
in value by 10.98%.15 Shelton concludes that Value Line's 
success in stock selection is further evidence that stock 
price behavior is predictable.
Hausman [1969] criticizes Shelton's study, and suggests 
that the results of Value Line's 1965-1966 contest are not 
inconsistent with the random walk hypothesis. He argues 
that the entrants, as a group, did not randomly select 
stocks since the frequency of stocks selected for portfolios
14 The 250 stocks in category 4 lost 5.23% in value, 
while the 100 stocks in category 5 lost 7.78%.
15 The 100 stocks in category 1 gained in value by 
5.11% during the six-month period.
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ranged from 7,413 to 83.16 Hausman [1969, p. 320] reaches 
the following conclusion:
The fact that investors (or contest entrants) 
tend to agree with each other need not mean that 
they know anything of value. Neither does the fact 
that, on a single occasion, they outperformed a 
random selection of stocks, especially if their 
degree of superiority was quite small when evaluat­
ing by means of the relevant measures of chance.
Murphy [1970] studies Value Line’s 1968-1969 contest, 
and he concurs with Shelton's conclusion that stock prices 
do not behave in an entirely random manner. However, the 
studies by Shelton and Murphy are not directly comparable 
since Value Line changed its contest rules before its 1968- 
1969 contest. For the 1968-1969 contest, 69,000 entrants 
selected a portfolio of 25 stocks from the entire list of 
1,258 stocks ranked by Value Line, but Value Line did not 
select a portfolio of stocks for the contestants to compete 
with. Instead, Value Line relied on a correlation between 
Value Line rankings and winning portfolios to prove the 
value of their rankings. Unfortunately, due to the 
popularity of the contest, Value Line did not calculate the 
mean portfolio returns as before for all 69,000 contestants. 
Instead, Value Line published the returns of the 1,258 
stocks used in the contest, each contestant calculated his
16 Since there were 18,565 entrants forming portfolios 
of 25 stocks each from a group of 350 stocks, the expected 
frequency of selection was 1,326 times per stock.
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or her own portfolio return, and potential prize winners 
with portfolio returns above +4% submitted claims to Value 
Line. Nevertheless, Murphy finds evidence of nonrandomness 
in stock market returns since the contestants once again 
outperformed the market, but he does not examine the 
correlation between rankings and portfolio performance.
Kaplan and Weil [1973a, pp. 57-58] sharply criticize 
Shelton and Murphy's studies as follows:
[N]either study controlled for the riskiness 
of the portfolios selected by contestants, hence 
both confounded portfolio performance with over­
all market movements. The failure of those arti­
cles to control for market effects casts consid­
erable doubt on the validity of their conclusions.
As believers of the efficient-market theory, 
we do not think we can pick a portfolio of 25 
stocks that will significantly and consistently 
outperform other portfolios of equal risk. Nor, 
we suppose, can anyone else. But Value Line does 
not control for the riskiness of contestants' 
portfolios in evaluating their performance.
In an effort to prove their point, they entered the 
1972-1973 Value Line contest with two portfolios. They 
selected a high-risk portfolio consisting of 25 stocks with 
the highest Value Line beta coefficients and a low-risk 
portfolio of 25 stocks with the lowest Value Line beta 
coefficients.17 Kaplan and Weil predicted the portfolios 
would perform as expected with modern portfolio theory,
17 The high-risk portfolio beta was 2.13, and the low- 
risk portfolio beta was 0.21.
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where high-risk (low-risk) portfolios perform the best 
during rising (falling) markets. However, Value Line would 
have predicted the two portfolios to perform about the same 
during the contest since the two portfolios had approxi­
mately the same rankings.18 During the six months of the 
contest, the 1,411 stocks listed by Value Line fell by an 
average of 6.65%. Kaplan and Weil's low-risk portfolio rose 
in value by 3.8%, while their high-risk portfolio fell in 
value by 22.9%. Only 2,043 of the 89,744 contestants' 
portfolios performed better than Kaplan and Weil's low-risk 
portfolio, and only 519 out of the 89,744 portfolios entered 
performed worse than Kaplan and Weil's high-risk portfolio. 
The contestants did not fare very well in their selections 
since 60% of the contestants chose portfolios with lower 
rates of return than the average for all stocks.19 Also, 
Value Line's rankings did not predict stock returns very 
well. The mean returns (betas) for rankings 1 through 5 
were as follows: -7.18% (1.09), -4.70% (1.01), -6.42%
(1.11), -7.68% (0.96), and -10.27% (1.15). Kaplan and Weil 
conclude that investors should not follow Value Line's 
rankings since they are flawed. Instead, investors should
18 The mean of the high-beta portfolio's Value Line 
rankings was 3.04, while the mean of the low-beta port­
folio 's rankings was 2.88.
19 Kaplan and Weil suggest that the contestants' poor 
performance is the result of their choosing a disproportion­
ately large number of high-beta stocks for their portfolios. 
The 25 most frequently selected stocks had a beta of 1.17 
and an average decline in value of 8.13%.
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maintain their portfolios at their desired level of risk.
Eisenstadt [1973], a Vice President and Director for 
Value Line, and Black [1973], employed by Value Line at that 
time, quickly criticize Kaplan and Heil for placing too much 
weight on six months of Value Line's eight year history.20 
Black performs a direct test of Value Line performance for 
the five-year period beginning in April 1965. The rankings 
are found to accurately predict stock returns after 
controlling for both risk (with the capital asset pricing 
model) and transaction costs. He evaluates equally-weighted 
portfolios that were adjusted monthly for ranking changes. 
The portfolio of stocks ranked 1 had a risk-adjusted rate of 
return of +10% before transaction costs, while stocks ranked 
5 had a risk-adjusted rate of return of -10%. The mean 
betas for stocks in rankings 1 through 5 were l.ll, 1.03,
0.98, 0.96, and 1.03. Thus, Black concludes that Value 
Line's rankings' anomalous performance is consistent over 
time, even though the average risk within the rankings is 
about the same.
Kaplan and Weil [1973b, pp. 14, 92] respond to Eisen­
stadt and Black as follows:
Fischer Black became involved with Value Line in 
1970 after he defended modern portfolio theory in a debate 
with Arnold Bernhard, the founder of Arnold Bernhard & 
Company, which publishes the Value Line Investment Survey.
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Both responses are more plugs for Value Line 
than criticisms of our points.... If Value Line does 
not believe that performance over this six-month 
period is representative of the long run, then why 
did Value Line emphasize...the pay-off to using the 
rankings in selecting stocks for the contest?
If Value Line stages another contest using the 
same rules as last year and if they invite us to 
enter the contest, then we will again enter two 
portfolios, one high-risk and one low-risk, and we 
predict that one of them will outperform Value 
Line's Group 1 stocks and the other will do worse 
than their Group 5 stocks.
After an eight-year stay, the debate is rejuvenated by 
Holloway [1981]. He simulates two investment strategies 
based on Value Line rankings from 1974 to 1977. The first 
strategy involves purchasing all 100 stocks ranked l by 
Value Line at the beginning of the year, holding the stocks 
for one year, and then adjusting the portfolio to include 
the 100 stocks ranked l by Value Line at the beginning of 
the next year. Using this strategy, Holloway finds that 
investors can receive abnormal returns even when transaction 
costs are included. In his second investment strategy, 
abnormal returns are calculated for a weekly-adjusted 
portfolio of stocks ranked 1. That is, with each new weekly 
issue of the Value Line Investment Survey, each stock down­
graded from category 1 is sold and its replacement is 
purchased.21 Holloway finds abnormal stock returns before 
transaction costs, but the abnormal returns are not large
21 There are always 100 stocks in Value Line's category
1. Therefore, there are always replacements for stocks 
downgraded by Value Line.
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enough to counter the large transaction costs associated 
with such an active investment policy. Also, Holloway finds 
no relation between stocks' Value Line rankings and betas.
Hanna [1983] and Gregory [1983] attack Holloway's 
paper. Hanna argues that Holloway has overstated the 
abnormal returns from the buy-and-hold simulation, and 
Gregory makes the following comment regarding Holloway's 
paper:
That Value Line has put together a string of 
market successes from 1965 to 1978 is no more sig­
nificant than the fact that there are always a few 
gamblers ahead of the house in Las Vegas....
This is not evidence of a capability system­
atically to beat the market.... But if Value Line 
performs equally well in the future, I promise to 
discard my faith in efficient markets.
Holloway [1983] responds to the Hanna and Gregory 
critiques by updating his previous study to include data 
through 1981 and reaching the same conclusions as before.
Copeland and Mayers [1982] find significant abnormal 
performance with Value Line recommendations from 1965 to 
1978, although the abnormal performance is less than that 
reported by Black. They report that the abnormal 
performance does not indicate a large market inefficiency 
after including transaction costs. Copeland and Mayers 
provide a methodological improvement over previous 
performance evaluations of Value Line recommendations. They 
escape the potential problems associated with the
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misspecification of the capital asset pricing model by 
employing the market model to estimate the benchmark 
expected return. Also, they find abnormal returns in the 
first test of Value Line ranking changes. For a strategy of 
buying upgraded stocks and selling short downgraded stocks, 
abnormal returns are found for the first and second weeks 
following ranking changes.
Stickel [1985] expands Copeland and Mayers test for the 
effect of Value Line ranking changes and finds that ranking 
changes affect common stock prices, but the impact varies by 
the type of ranking change and by event day. In a study of 
1,427 ranking changes during the 191 weeks from July 16,
1976 to March 7, 1980, Stickel finds that the largest impact 
on stock prices occurs when firms are changed from ranking 2 
to ranking 1. The average abnormal returns (Z-statistics) 
for event days 0, +1, and +2 are 0.86% (10.91), 0.86% 
(11.27), and 0.72% (9.93), which are significant at the 0.01 
level. Ranking changes from 1 to 2, 3 to 2, and 2 to 3 have 
lower average abnormal returns, and they are statistically 
significant a combined 7 out of 9 times on event days 0, +1, 
and +2. Ranking changes from 4 to 3, 3 to 4, 5 to 4, and 4 
to 5 have even lower average abnormal returns, and they are 
statistically significant a combined 3 out of 12 times on 
event days 0, +1, and +2.
Stickel also considers cross-sectional differences in 
the information content of Value Line ranking changes, and
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he finds that firm size (market value of common stock plus 
book value of liabilities) is the best variable which 
explains the extent of standardized abnormal returns. He 
tests the hypothesis that smaller (larger) firms have larger 
positive (negative) standardized abnormal returns with 
Spearman rank correlations for all ranking change groups, 
and he finds a significant relation between the variables.
Huberman and Kandel [1987, p. 578] also suggest that 
there is a relation between firm size and Value Line 
rankings in the following statement:
The Value Line anomaly is similar to the small 
firm anomaly. The smaller a firm, the higher its 
mean return. The higher the rank given to a firm 
by Value Line, the higher its mean return. Both 
statements remain valid even after the usual market 
risk adjustment, and these high excess returns are 
of the same order of magnitude.... Value Line's 
record could be interpreted as a manifestation of 
the familiar size effect.
However, in a study of 1,633 firms ranked by Value Line 
from 1976 to 1985, Huberman and Kandel sort companies by 
ranking and firm size, and they find no evidence that the 
Value Line anomaly is a function of firm size.
Finally, Peterson [1987] studies the daily stock price 
impact of initial reviews by Value Line from 1969 to 1982.
He finds that initial reviews convey information to the 
market since statistically significant abnormal returns are 
found for three days surrounding the publication date.
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2.4 Summary of Related Literature
Previous research involving the information content of 
common stock rankings provide an interesting framework for 
this study, standard & Poor's common stock rankings are 
found by Haugen [1979], Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983, 
1984], and Muller and Fielitz [1987] to furnish investors 
with a good measure of risk. However, Standard & Poor's 
rankings are not found to be a reliable measure of return. 
Value Line's common stock rankings are found by Black 
[1973], Holloway [1981], and Copeland and Mayers [1982] to 
provide investors with a sound investment strategy in which 
abnormal returns are found for the period from 1965 to 1981. 
However, Value Line's rankings are not found to be closely 
related to risk. Also, stickel [1985] finds information 
content in Value Line ranking changes, and the portfolio 
price adjustment takes approximately three days subsequent 
to the public release of the ranking changes. This study 
contributes to this previous research by examining the 
information content of standard & Poor's common stock 
ranking changes.
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Table 2.1
Standard & Poor's common stock rankings are found to be 
good predictors of risk by Haugen [1979]. The original 
rankings of 806 stocks in 1956 are compared with their 













A+ 0.769 0.00140 102 81 0.79 0.0078
A 0.779 0.00139 149 111 0.74 0.0089
A- 0.803 0.00143 130 92 0.71 0.0100
B+ 0.938 0.00191 198 106 0.54 0.0099
B 1.127 0.00283 93 51 0.55 0.0124
B- 1.208 0.00331 74 31 0.42 0.0114
C 1.378 0.00457 60 22 0.37 0.0115
Source: R. Haugen, "Do Common Stock Quality Ratings Predict 
Risk?" Financial Analysts Journal. March-April 1979, p. 69.
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Table 2.2
Standard & Poor's common stock rankings are found to be a 
good proxy for risk by Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983], 
However, the relation between return and risk is not con­
stant over time. Also, risk is related to the variability 
in earnings changes. Figures are in percent.
a of Mean of a of Mean of
Port­ Total Total Earnings Earnings
folio Returns Returns Changes Changes
Total Time Period (12/70 to 6/791:
A+ 9.5 1.9 9.4 2.9
A 10.0 3.0 17.5 4.7
A- 12.4 3.1 23.7 5.8
B+ 12.6 3.3 25.4 6.3
B 16.7 3.8 70.6 15.9
S&P 400 12.3 2.2 16.3 4.7
First Time Period f12/70 to 6/731:
A+ 5.0 4.4 9.5 2.5
A 6.6 3.0 15.3 5.9
A- 9.9 2.9 18.5 6.1
B+ 10.2 0.9 23.7 7.5
B 15.2 0.6 34.4 12.8
S&P 400 5.4 3.0 10.5 5.6
Second Time Period 19/73 to 6/761:
A+ 14.8 1.2 12.3 3.4
A 15.0 4.2 14.6 3.6
A- 18.4 4.4 33.0 6.1
B+ 18.0 5.3 28.7 5.8
B 23.4 4.5 110.5 26.7
S&P 400 19.8 1.8 20.4 6.1
Third Time Period <9/76 to 6/791:
A+ 5.4 0.3 6.4 2.8
A 6.4 1.9 14.9 4.6
A- 6.7 2.0 18.4 5.1
B+ 7.6 3.4 25.7 5.7
B 9.3 6.0 43.4 7.8
S&P 400 6.9 2.0 17.2 2.3
Source: F. Muller, B. Fielitz, and M. Greene, "S&P Quality
Rankings: Risk and Return." Journal of Portfolio Manaaement.
Summer 1983, p. 40.
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Table 2.3
Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983] find that standard & 
Poor's rankings are a good measure of risk as measured by 
beta. Also, portfolio A has the highest reward-to-varia- 
bility ratio for the entire ten-year period, but portfolios 
A+,B+, and B outperform portfolio A in the first, second, 
and third subperiods, respectively.
Portfolio Reward-To-Variability Ratios 














A+ 0.88 0.20 0.89 0.08 0.05
A 1.06 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.30
A- 1.12 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.29
B+ 1.17 0.26 0.09 0.30 0.45
B 1.33 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.65
S&P
400 0.18 0.55 0.09 0.29
Source: F. Muller, B. Fielitz, and M. Greene, "S&P Quality 
Group Rankings: Risk and Return," Journal of Portfolio 
Management. Summer 1983, pp. 40-41.
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithou t permission.
36
Table 2.4
Standard & Poor's common stock rankings are found to a good 
measure of firm size and return on equity by Muller and 
Fielitz [1984]. They find that the higher the ranking, 
the higher the mean sales, net worth, and return on equity 








Return on Equity 
(Percent)
1972 1975 1978 1972 1975 1978 1972 1975 1978
A+ 3.28 5.27 7.37 1.86 2.52 3.04 17.4 17.2 18.5
[0) (3.4) (5.4) (7.5) (2.0) (2.8) (3.5) (4.4) (4.8) (4.4)
A 2.12 3.34 5.10 1.02 1.35 1.93 13.3 15.2 15.8
(o) (4.1) (6.1) (9.5) (1.9) (2.4) (3.3) (4.6) (3.7) (4.0)
A- 0.91 1.39 1.95 0.54 0.65 0.81 12.5 12.2 14.5
(ff) (1.1) (1.8) (2.5) (0.8) (0.9) (1.1) (4.2) (4.8) (3.9)
B+ 0.41 0.54 0.78 0.18 0.23 0.25 10.9 10.9 13.5
(a) (0.5) (0.6) (0.8) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (3.7) (5.3) (5.3)
B 0.23 0.31 0.51 0.10 0.12 0.16 7.4 4.9 12.4
(O) (0.4) (0.5) (0.9) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (6.0) (7.9) (7.9)
Source: F. Muller, B. Fielitz, and M. Greene, "Portfolio 
Performance in Relation to Quality, Earnings, Dividends, 
Firm Size, Leverage, and Return on Equity," Journal of 
Financial Research. Spring 1984, p. 24.





The purpose of this paper is to examine the information 
content of common stock ranking changes made by Standard & 
Poor's. The behavior of common stock prices surrounding the 
memorandum dates is examined. This chapter discusses the 
methodology utilized in testing for such an effect, the 
period of study, and the sample and data collection 
procedures.
3.2 The Event Study Methodology
3.2.1 Measurement of Abnormal Returns
Event study methodology models expected security 
returns, then computes the deviation of actual returns from 
expected returns and the statistical significance of the 
deviation. This study utilizes the market model to estimate 
the benchmark expected return.22 The market model can be
22 See Fama [1976], Brown and Warner [1980, 1985], or 
Appendix C for further discussion of the market model. The 
benchmark returns are also estimated using the market adjus­
ted returns model. Appendix D contains a definition of the 
model and empirical results.
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R it -  a i + + e i t  . . .  ( 3 . 1 )
where
Rjt = rate of return on common stock of firm i on day t,
= rate of return on an equally weighted New York- and 
America stock Exchange index.
ajf Bj = ordinary least squares regression parameters,
ejt = error term for common stock of firm i on day t.
If the joint hypotheses of capital market efficiency and 
market model validity hold true, then any statistically 
significant deviations of ejt from zero will indicate that 
firm-specific information is present. Therefore, if the 
release by standard & Poor's of common stock ranking changes 
provides information to the market, then the presence of 
this information will be evident from the statistically 
significant departure of the error terms from zero.
The estimation period covers the period from t = +61 to 
t = +210 (where t = 0 is the memorandum announcement date). 
The period following the event dates is used as an 
estimation period following studies by Stickel [1986] and 
Holthausen and Leftwich [1986]. Stickel [1986, p. 203], 
arguing in the case of bond rating changes, states that:
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[R]ating agencies, responding to the changing 
financial conditions of the companies they follow, 
tend to increase the rating of companies recently 
experiencing positive abnormal returns and decrease 
the rating of companies recently experiencing nega­
tive abnormal returns. Using the period prior to a 
rating change as the benchmark period would imply 
this 'unusual' performance is expected to continue 
in the event period.
The market portfolio returns and the stock returns are 
provided by the University of Chicago Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP).
The deviation of actual return from expected return 
(abnormal return) is defined for security i in period t as
AR,.t = R,t - (*, + . . . (3.2)
where and ‘3i are the parameters estimated from equation 
(3.1).
Average abnormal return (AAR) for portfolio j in period 
t is computed as
n
AAR,. = S ARjt / n, . . .  (3.3)
i=l
where n is the number of securities in portfolio j with a 
computed abnormal return in period t.
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) over 
various holding periods of k days from days t to t+k is




CAARtt+k = S AARr . . . (3.4)
r=t
3.2.2 The Test Statistic
The statistical significance of the abnormal returns 
from zero is tested by t-statistics, a parametric test which 
standardizes portfolio average abnormal returns. The test 
statistics are assumed to be distributed approximately unit 
normal in the absence of an event.
In order to calculate the t-statistics, abnormal 
returns are first standardized for each stock i by their 
estimated standard deviation over event days +61 to +160.
For all definitions of abnormal performance, the formula is
+160 _
SARjt = AR;t / [ S (ARit - AR.)2 / 99] 1/2 . . .  (3.5)
t=+61
where AR{ is the average daily abnormal return on security i 
over event days +61 to +160. The SARjt are distributed 
approximately student-t with 99 degrees of freedom (assuming 
that the ARjt are normally distributed with mean zero and 
constant variance). Standardized abnormal returns are used
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithou t permission.
41
to calculate t-statistics by the formula 
n k
tjT = S ( 2 SARit / k1/z) / n1/z . . . (3.6)
i=l t=l
with n-l degrees of freedom, where n is the number of 
securities in portfolio j and k is the number of days over 
which SARU are cumulated.
3.3 Sample Size and Sampling Procedures
3.3.1 Period of Study
This paper examines common stock ranking changes made 
by Standard & Poor's during the twenty-four month period 
from June 1, 1985 to May 30, 1987 (and published in the 
Stock Guide from July 1985 to June 1987). During this 
period there were 1,879 common stock ranking changes 
published in the Stock Guide.23 Table 3.1 lists the 
population of ranking changes by the seven major categories 
tested. These categories are Within-Class Upgrades, Within- 
Class Downgrades, Across-Class Upgrades, Across-Class 
Downgrades, Ranking to NR, NR to a High Ranking, and NR to a 
Low Ranking. In addition to these seven categories, the
23 Standard & Poor's made ranking changes on 482 of the 
496 business days during the two-year period for a mean of 
3.79 ranking changes made per day.
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following ranking changes are also tested: A to A+, A- to A, 
B to B+, B- to B, A+ to A, A to A-, B+ to B, B to B-, B+ to 
A-, C to B-, A- to B+, and B- to C. Table 3.2 lists the 
population of ranking changes during the two-year period of 
study.
During the period from May 1, 1985 to June 30, 1987, 
the stock market rose sharply in value. The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average rose in value by 97% (1242.05 on May 1, 
1985 to 2446.91 on June 30, 1987), and the Standard & Poor's 
500 stock index rose in value during the same period by 73% 
(178.37 to 307.90). However, during this two-year "bull" 
market (prior to the October 1987 stock market crash), 
Standard & Poor's downgraded 1,172 common stocks while they 
upgraded only 408 common stocks.
3.3.2 Sample Selection Procedure
Memoranda containing daily ranking changes from June 1, 
1985 to May 30, 1987 were obtained by request from Standard 
& Poor's.24 For inclusion in the sample, a firm must be 
included in the University of Chicago Center for Research in
24 In a letter (dated September 27, 1988) which accom­
panied the memoranda, Standard & Poor's request that the 
documents be kept confidential. Therefore, individual 
company names, dates, and stock rankings are not published 
in this paper. However, since the ranking changes are 
published monthly in the stock Guide, the specific dates of 
the ranking changes are the only unpublished information.
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Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Stock Files during the period 
of study. Of the 1,879 ranking changes made by Standard & 
Poor's during the two-year sample period, 1,025 ranking 
changes were made for companies which have insufficient data 
in the CRSP files, leaving 834 ranking changes in the 
sample. Of the remaining 834 ranking changes, 10 ranking 
changes were deleted since they changed by more than one 
ranking, leaving a sample of 824 ranking changes.25 Table
3.3 lists the 824 sample ranking changes by category.
25 Changes by more than one ranking are deleted since 
they would bias results in favor of finding significant 
abnormal returns.
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Table 3.1
Population by category. Common stock ranking 
changes published in the Standard & Poor's 
Stock Guide. July 1985 - June 1987.
Prior New Po d.
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Table 3.2
Transition matrix of common stock ranking changes. 
Population of 1879 changes published in s & P 
Stock Guide. July 1985 - June 1987.
New Ranking
Prior
Ranking A+ A A-■ B+ B B-■ C D NR Liq T.
A+ 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50
A 35 - 109 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 147
A- 0 61 - 185 0 1 0 0 6 0 253
B+ 0 1 60 - 275 0 1 1 3 1 342
B 0 0 0 71 - 298 7 3 3 0 382
B- 0 0 0 0 80 - 226 1 2 1 310
C 0 0 0 1 0 97 - 15 3 0 116
D 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 - 5 0 7
NR 3 4 3 44 61 47 83 25 - 2 272
Lig 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ”* 0
Total 38 116 172 301 416 443 319 45 25 4 1879
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Table 3.3
Sample of common stock ranking changes by category. 
Memorandum dates from June 1985 to May 1987.
Prior New Samole Total
Within-Class Upgrades A A+ 20
A- A 31
B B+ 26
B- B 40 117
Across-Class Upgrades B+ A- 27
C B- 46
D C 1 74
All Upgrades 191
Within-Class Downgrades A+ A 33
A A- 70
B+ B 138
B B- 140 381
Across-Class Downgrades A- B+ 102
B- C 95
C D 4 201
All Downgrades 582
Ranking to NR A- NR 5
B+ NR 1
B NR 2
D NR 1 9
NR to High Ranking NR A 1
NR B+ 8 9
NR to Low Ranking NR B 14
NR B- 3
NR C 14
NR D 2 33
NR to Ranking 42
All Ranking Changes 824





The empirical results from investigating the informa­
tion content of Standard & Poor's common stock ranking 
changes are reported in this chapter. Section 4.2 contains 
a description of the common stock price response at the 
memorandum dates to upgrades made by Standard & Poor's, and 
section 4.3 contains a description of the common stock price 
response at the memorandum dates to downgrades made by the 
Standard & Poor's corporation. Tests performed to determine 
whether the positive (negative) abnormal returns found 
before upgrades (downgrades) are a function of firm size are 
presented in section 4.4. The effect of the initiation or 
withdrawal of a Standard & Poor's ranking on stock prices is 
examined in section 4.5. Section 4.6 contains a description 
of the risk and return characteristics of portfolios of 
common stocks both before and after a ranking change. 
Finally, empirical results are summarized in section 4.7.
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithou t permission.
48
4.2 Information Content at the Memorandum Dates: Upgrades
The daily average abnormal returns (AAR), t-statistics, 
and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) from day -50 
through day +50, where day 0 is the Standard & Poor's 
memorandum date, are calculated for each portfolio. The 
portfolios of upgraded stocks, A to A+, A- to A, B to B+,
B- to B, Within-Class Upgrades, B+ to A-, C to B-, Across- 
Class Upgrades, and All Upgrades, are contained in tables
4.1 through 4.9, respectively. A summary of confounding 
events for All Upgrades on days -5 through 5, where day 0 is 
the Standard & Poor's memorandum date, is presented in table 
4.10.
When examined separately, the empirical results for 
portfolios of upgraded stocks (A to A+, A- to A, B to B+, B- 
to B, B+ to A-, and C to B-) offer evidence from which 
inferences are difficult to reach. However, when grouped 
into portfolios of Within-Class Upgrades, Across-Class 
Upgrades, and All Upgrades, the empirical results provide a 
more stable pattern from which inferences can be drawn.
Empirical results for common stocks upgraded from A to 
A+ by Standard & Poor's are summarized in table 4.1. For 
these 20 companies, there is little continuity in daily 
AARs. However, an upward movement in AARs begins on day -1 
as CAARs rise by 1.13 percentage points during the four day 
period from day -1 to day 2. CAARs reach a peak of 1.24% on
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithou t permission.
49
day 2. Statistically significant positive AARs are found on 
day -7, with an AAR (t-statistic) of 0.73% (2.36), and day 
6, with an AAR (t-statistic) of 0.57% (2.13). Statistically 
significant negative AARs are found on day 8, with an AAR 
(t-statistic) of -0.75% (-2.24), and day 10, with an AAR (t- 
statistic) of -1.05% (-3.09).
Empirical results for the portfolio of stocks upgraded 
from A- to A are reported in table 4.2. This portfolio of 
31 stocks has a statistically significant negative AAR 
(t-statistic) on days -30 to -21 of -0.16% (-2.13), followed 
by statistically significant positive AARs on day -9, with 
an AAR (t-statistic) of 0.79% (2.69), and day -5, with an 
AAR (t-statistic) of 0.50% (2.08). The CAARs for this 
portfolio reach a peak of 2.13% on day 6.
Table 4.3 contains the results for the portfolio of 26 
stocks upgraded from B to B+. This portfolio has a 
statistically significant positive AAR (t-statistic) on day 
-1 of 0.96% (2.12), and CAARs reach a maximum of 1.28% on 
day 0. Following day 0, CAARs fall on days 1 through 5 by
1.03 percentage points.
The results for the portfolio of 40 stocks upgraded 
from B- to B are reported in table 4.4. For this portfolio, 
CAARs rise prior to the memorandum date to 1.65% on day -l. 
However, a statistically significant drop in AARs occurs on 
day 0, with an AAR (t-statistic) of -0.86% (-2.21).
Following another negative AAR on day 1, a statistically
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significant positive AAR occurs on day 2, with an AAR (t- 
statistic) of 0.58% (2.15). CAARs finally reach a high of 
2.28% on days 21 to 30.
Table 4.5 contains the empirical results for the 
Within-Class Upgrades portfolio, which consists of 117 
stocks upgraded from A to A+, A- to A, B to B+, and B- to B. 
For this larger portfolio, one notable finding is the 
absence of statistically significant AARs prior to the 
memorandum date. The only statistically significant AAR is 
on day 6, with an AAR (t-statistic) of 0.34% (2.22).
However, there is a discernable pattern in AARs prior to the 
memorandum date. CAARs rise by 1.47 percentage points from 
day -9 to day -1. For the fifty days subsequent to day 0 
there is no continuity in AARs, while CAARs peak at 1.47% on 
day 9. Thus, these results provide weak evidence that 
information is incorporated in security prices prior to the 
memorandum date.
The results for 27 stocks upgraded by Standard & Poor's 
from B+ to A- are reported in table 4.6. Again, a notable 
rise in CAARs occurs prior to the memo-randum date. CAARs 
rise by 3.08 percentage points from day -8 to day -2, 
reaching a peak of 2.46% on day -2. A statis-tically 
significant negative AAR (t-statistic) of -0.59% (-2.60) 
occurs on day 4, and a statistically significant positive 
AAR (t-statistic) of 0.63% (2.12) occurs on day 8.
The empirical results for 46 stocks upgraded from C to
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
51
B- are contained in table 4.7. This portfolio exhibits the 
most marked increase in CAARs prior to day 0. CAARs rise by 
3.70 percentage points during the eight-day period from day 
-9 to day -2, reaching a peak of 3.30% on day 2. During 
this eight-day period, statistically significant positive 
AARs occur on days -7, -3, and -2, with AARs (t-statistic)
Of 0.78% (2.33), 0.89% (2.79), and 1.70% (3.67), 
respectively. The eight-day rise in CAARs of 3.70 
percentage points is followed by a seven-day reversal by 
2.39 percentage points (days -1 to 5). Statistically 
significant positive AARs also occur on days 6 and 10.
Table 4.8 reports the results for the Across-Class 
Upgrades portfolio, which consists of 74 stocks upgraded 
from B+ to A-, C to B-, and D to C. For this large 
portfolio, CAARs rise by 3.58 percentage points from day -9 
to day -2, peaking on day -2 at 3.11%. Statistically 
significant positive AARs (t-statistic) of 0.75% (2.88), 
0.76% (3.11), and 1.28% (3.91), occur on days -7, -3, and 
-2, respectively. This portfolio provides stronger evidence 
than the Within-Class Upgrades portfolio that information is 
incorporated in security prices prior to the memorandum 
date.
The empirical results for the All Upgrades portfolio 
are contained in table 4.9. When Within-Class Upgrades and 
Across-Class Upgrades are joined to form one large portfolio 
of 191 stocks, a more discernible pattern in AARs develops.
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AARs are positive for each of the nine days prior to the
memorandum date. During this nine-day period, CAARs rise by
2.09 percentage points, reaching a peak of 1.85% on day -1; 
and statistically significant positive AARs occur on days
-9, -7, -3, and -2, with AARs (t-statistic) of 0.24% (2.22),
0.33% (2.35), 0.39% (2.87), and 0.49% (1.97), respectively. 
This nine-day rise in CAARs is followed by a reversal of 
0.87 percentage points on days 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4. Thus, for 
stocks upgraded by Standard & Poor's, information is fully 
incorporated in stock prices prior to the memorandum date, 
which suggests that Standard & Poor's upgrades are made in 
response to the public release of information. However, 
the results on days -10 and 6 do not fit this pattern. The 
AAR (t-statistic) on day -10 is -0.35% (-2.06), and the AAR 
(t-statistic) on day 6 is 0.40% (2.61). The statistically 
significant positive AAR on day 6 may be the result of 
customers of the Interactive Data Corporation buying stocks 
which were recently upgraded by Standard & Poor's.
In order to reach stronger inferences from these 
results, a Wall Street Journal Index search for confounding 
events is necessary. The frequency of confounding events 
reported in the Wall Street Journal for All Upgrades, by 
type of confounding event on days -5 through 5, are reported 
in table 4.10. Since net incomes were announced on days -4 
through 0 for 186 of the 191 companies upgraded by Standard 
& Poor's, it is apparent that Standard & Poor's upgrades
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stocks subsequent to the public release of information. 
However, due to the absence of confounding events on days 
-10 and 6, the statistically significant AARs on days -10 
(negative) and 6 (positive) are puzzling, but both AARs may 
be the result of a sample size which is small when compared 
with the All Downgrades portfolio.
4.3 Information Content at the Memorandum Dates: Downgrades
The daily average abnormal returns (AAR), t-statistics, 
and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) from day -50 
through day +50, where day 0 is the Standard & Poor's 
memorandum date, are calculated for each portfolio. The 
portfolios of downgraded stocks, A+ to A, A to A-, B+ to B,
B to B-, Within-Class Downgrades, A- to B+, B- to C, C to D, 
Across-Class Downgrades, and All Downgrades, are reported in 
tables 4.11 through 4.20, respectively. A summary of 
confounding events for All Downgrades on days -5 through 5, 
where day 0 is the Standard & Poor's memorandum date, is 
presented in table 4.20.
The empirical results for the 33 stocks downgraded from 
A+ to A are reported in table 4.11. These stocks' returns 
exhibit a dramatic downturn prior to the memorandum date. 
Statistically significant AARs (t-statistic) of -0.24% 
(-2.26), -0.88% (-3.38), -0.68% (-2.26), 0.46% (2.08),
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-0.80% (-2.28), -0.67% (-2.49), and -0.43% (-2.02) are found 
on days -50 to -41, -6, -5, -4, -2, -1, and 0, respectively. 
While CAARs reach -4.59% on day 0, they continue to fall for 
the 50 days subsequent to day 0, reaching -6.83% on days 41 
to 50. Thus, for these stocks downgraded from A+ to A, 
stock prices show a steady marked decline for approximately 
two months following the downgrading by Standard & Poor's.
The results for the 70 companies downgraded from A to 
A- are reported in table 4.12. The only AAR for these 
stocks which is statistically different from zero occurs on 
day 6, with an AAR (t-statistic) of -0.35% (-2.00). Other 
than day 0, there is little movement in the AARs, and the 
CAAR on day 0 is positive 0.20%. Thus, there is a striking 
contrast between the AARs for A+ to A downgrades and A to A- 
downgrades.
Table 4.13 contains the results for companies down­
graded from B+ to B. For these 138 companies, there are 
several significant reversals in AARs. The statistically 
significant AARs (t-statistic) are as follows: -0.13%
(-1.97) on days -50 to -41, 0.26% (2.09) on day -10, -0.32% 
(-2.07) on day -7, -0.59% (-3.79) on day -2, 0.33% (3.25) on 
day 3, and -0.44% (-2.62) on day 8. These reversals in AARs 
cause an interesting pattern in CAARs. CAARs fall by 0.91 
percentage points from days -8 to -1, rise by 0.85 percen­
tage points from days 0 to 7, and fall by 0.89 percentage 
points during the next four periods.
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The results for the 140 firms downgraded from B to B- 
are reported in table 4.14. CAARs reach a low of -1.56% on 
day -1, following a statistically significant negative AAR 
(t-statistic) of -0.84% (-3.91) on day -1. A statistically 
significant positive AAR (t-statistic) of 0.75% occurs on 
day 1.
Table 4.15 contains the results for the Within-Class 
Downgrades portfolio, which includes stocks downgraded from 
A+ to A, A to A-, B+ to B, and B to B- by Standard & Poor's. 
For this large portfolio of 381 stocks, CAARs reach a low of 
-1.20% on day -1, which is further support that information 
is fully incorporated in security prices prior to the 
memorandum date. Statistically significant negative AARs 
(t-statistic) Of -0.21% (-2.16), -0.48% (-3.52), -0.43% 
(-3.13), and -0.31% (-2.94) occur on days -5, -2, -1, and 8.
The empirical results for the 102 downgrades from A- to 
B+ are presented in table 4.16. The only statistically 
significant AAR (t-statistic) for this portfolio, -0.16% 
(-3.24%), occurs on days 21 to 30. While CAARs reach 
-0.75% on day 0, CAARs continue to fall subsequent to the 
memorandum date, reaching -1.21% on days 41 to 50.
The results for the 95 stocks downgraded from B- to C 
are contained in table 4.17. A statistically significant 
negative AAR (t-statistic) of -0.99% (-2.47) occurs on day 
-1, and CAARs reach a low of -3.55% on day 1. A strong 
reversal in CAARs occurs following day 0, with CAARs rising
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to -0.70% on days 41 to 50.
Table 4.18 contains the results for the four stocks 
downgraded from C to D. The AAR (t-statistic) on day -1 is 
-29.55% (-10.62), and CAARs reach a low of -44.68% on day 
10. Each of these four companies filed Chapter 11 bank­
ruptcy on day -1.
The results for the portfolio of 201 Across-Class Down­
grades, which includes downgrades from A- to B+, B- to C, 
and c to D, are reported in table 4.19. For this large 
portfolio, statistically significant negative AARs 
(t-statistic) of -0.15% (-2.08) and -1.01% (-2.82) occur on 
days -40 to -31 and day -1, respectively. CAARs reach a low 
of -2.77% on day 1.
Within-Class Downgrades and Across-Class Downgrades are 
combined to form the All Downgrades portfolio of 582 stocks, 
and empirical results for the All Downgrades portfolio are 
reported in table 4.20. Statistically significant negative 
AARs (t-statistic) of -0.23% (-2.49), -0.30% (-3.03), and 
-0.63% (-4.12) are found on days -5, -2, and -1, respec­
tively. CAARs reach a low of -1.68% on day 0. These 
results provide further evidence that Standard & Poor's 
common stock ranking changes are made in response to 
publicly released information.
In order to reach stronger inferences from these 
results, a Wall Street Journal Index search for confounding 
events is necessary. The frequency of confounding events
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reported in the Wall Street Journal for All Downgrades, by 
type of confounding event on days -5 to 5, are reported in 
table 4.21. Of the 582 stocks downgraded by Standard & 
Poor's during the two-year period, 565 had a public release 
of net income reported in the Wall Street Journal during the 
five-day period from day -4 to day 0. Thus, Standard & 
Poor's downgrades common stocks subsequent to the public 
release of information.
4.4 Abnormal Returns and Firm Size
Regression tests are performed to determine whether the 
positive (negative) abnormal returns found prior to the 
memorandum dates of upgraded (downgraded) companies are a 
function of firm size. The dependent variable is the 
abnormal return for each company cumulated over event days 
-3, -2, and -1. A regression test is performed for both 
upgrades and downgrades for each of the three independent 
variables: total assets, sales, and market value. Table 
4.22 contains the results of the three regressions involving 
upgraded companies, and table 4.23 contains the results of 
the tests with downgraded companies.
The hypothesis that positive AARs found prior to 
upgrades are inversely related to firm size is rejected 
based on the results reported in table 4.22. Statistically
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insignificant t-statistics of -0.571, -1.399, and -0.962 are 
found for total assets, sales, and market value, 
respect ively.
Table 4.23 reports the finding that negative AARs found 
prior to downgrades are not a function of firm size. 
Statistically insignificant t-statistics of -0.168, 0.079, 
and 1.407 are found for total assets, sales, and market 
value, respectively.
4.5 The Initiation and Withdrawal of a Ranking
The daily average abnormal returns (AAR), t-statistics,
and cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) from day -50
through day +50, where day 0 is the Standard & Poor's
memorandum date, are calculated for four portfolios of 
common stocks involving the initiation or withdrawal of a 
ranking.
Table 4.24 contains the results of companies changed 
from a ranking to NR. For these nine companies, 
statistically significant negative AARs (t-statistic) of 
-4.12% (-2.49), -5.90% (-5.55), -3.84% (-3.78), -2.31% 
(-3.51), and -3.54% (-4.83) occur on days -2, -1, 0, 6, and 
8, respectively. CAARs reach a low of -23.63% on day 9.
Table 4.25 contains empirical results for the nine 
companies changed by Standard & Poor's from NR to a high
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ranking (A+, A, A-, and B+). None of the AARs are 
statistically different from zero, yet CAARs fall to -4.83% 
on days 41 to 50.
Table 4.26 reports results for 33 companies changed by 
Standard & Poor's from NR to a low ranking (B, B-, C, and 
D). The only statistically significant AAR occurs on day 
-4, with an AAR (t-statistic) of 1.41% (2.43).
The results of all companies changed from NR to a 
ranking are presented in table 4.27. The only statistically 
significant AAR occurs on day -4, with an AAR of 1.13%, and 
a t-statistic of 2.26. Thus, CAARs fall to -17.82% on day 0 
for the Ranking to NR portfolio reported in table 4.24, 
while the CAAR on day 0 for the NR to Ranking portfolio is 
-0.59%.
The return and standard deviation of return for both a 
pre-event period and a post-event period are calculated for 
the four portfolios involving the initiation or withdrawal 
of a ranking. The pre-event period is the 50 days prior to 
the memorandum date, and the post-event period is the 50 
days subsequent to the memorandum date. The return and 
standard deviation of return for the four portfolios are 
presented in table 4.28. Based on these data, it appears 
that Standard & Poor's rankings are a better measure of risk 
than return, which is consistent with previous findings. 
Using the standard deviation of returns as a measure of 
risk, the No Ranking to High Ranking portfolio contains the
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least amount of risk both before the ranking change (1.74%) 
and after the ranking change (1.94%). However, the No 
Ranking to Low Ranking portfolio has the highest return both 
before (6.85%) and after (5.37%) the ranking change.
A paired t-test is performed to the four groups to 
determine whether portfolio betas change subsequent to the 
memorandum date. The pre-event period is from day -250 to 
day -51, and the post-event period is from day 51 to day 
250. The results of the (two-tailed) t-tests are contained 
in table 4.29.
For the Ranking to NR portfolio, the mean beta rises
from 0.80 to 0.82, and the low values for both the pre­
event portfolio beta and the post-event portfolio beta are 
surprising. However, as reported in table 4.30, four of the 
nine companies in the portfolio are public utilities (Kansas 
Gas & Electric, Middle South Utilities, Gulf States Utility, 
and Duquesne Light), which usually have low betas.
For the No Ranking to High Ranking portfolio, the mean
beta falls by a statistically significant 0.27 points from
1.02 to 0.75. The No Ranking to Low Ranking portfolio mean 
beta falls from 1.00 to 0.98. Finally, the No Ranking to 
Ranking portfolio mean beta falls from 1.01 to 0.93.
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4.6 Risk and Return Characteristics of Rankings
The return and standard deviation of return for both a 
pre-event period and a post-event period are calculated for 
the portfolios of upgraded and downgraded stocks. The 
upgraded portfolios include A to A+, A- to A, B+ to A-, B to 
B+, B- to B, C to B-, Within-Class Upgrades, Across-Class 
Upgrades, and All Upgrades; and the downgraded portfolios 
include A+ to A, A to A-, A- to B+, B+ to B, B to B-, B- to 
C, c to D, Within-Class Downgrades, Across-Class Downgrades, 
and All Downgrades. The pre-event period is the 50 days 
prior to the memorandum date, and the post-event period is 
the 50 days subsequent to the memorandum date. The return 
and standard deviation of return for these nineteen port­
folios are presented in table 4.31.
The most striking result reported in table 4.31 is the 
correspondence between Standard & Poor's rankings and risk 
(measured by the standard deviation of returns), both before 
and after ranking changes. For portfolios before an 
upgrade, the following standard deviations (ranking) are 
found; 1.68% (A), 1.53% (A-), 2.03% (B+), 2.13% (B), 2.55% 
(B-), and 2.92% (C). For portfolios subsequent to an 
upgrading, the following standard deviations (ranking) are 
found: 1.79% (A+), 1.75% (A), 1.85% (A-), 2.17% (B+), 2.51%
(B), and 3.29% (B-). Thus, except for the portfolio up­
graded from A- to A, risk rises for each lower ranking, both
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before and after ranking changes.
For portfolios prior to a downgrading, the following 
standard deviations (ranking) are found: 1.72% (A+), 1.76%
(A), 1.80% (A-), 2.35% (B+), 3.20% (B), 4.09% (B-), and 
7.71% (C). For portfolios subsequent to a downgrading, the 
following standard deviations (ranking) are found: 1.73%
(A), 1.88% (A-), 1.94% (B+), 2.46% (B), 3.07% (B-), 3.94%
(C), and 7.73% (D). Thus, for portfolios of downgrades, 
risk also rises for each lower ranking, both before and 
after ranking changes.
While Standard & Poor's rankings are found to be a 
reliable measure of risk, no relation is found between 
rankings and return, which is consistent with previous 
findings. This study expands previous research by examining 
risk and return both before and after a ranking change.
A paired t-test is performed to the nineteen groups to 
determine whether portfolio betas change subsequent to the 
memorandum date. The pre-event period is from day -250 to 
day -51, and the post-event period is from day 51 to day 
250. The upgraded companies are tested for a fall in the
mean portfolio beta, and the results of the (one-tailed)
t-tests are contained in table 4.32. The downgraded 
companies are tested for a rise in the portfolio beta, and 
the results of the (one-tailed) t-tests are contained in 
table 4.33. Finally, the results from grouping the mean 
portfolio betas by ranking are presented in table 4.32.
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As reported in table 4.32, eight of the nine portfolios 
of upgrades experienced a decline in beta following ranking 
changes, and four of the portfolios (B to B+, c to B-, 
Across-Class Upgrades, and All Upgrades) had statistically 
significant drops in beta following ranking changes. The 
mean beta for the B to B+ portfolio fell from 1.42 to 1.20, 
with a t-statistic of -1.95. The C to B- portfolio beta 
fell from 1.32 to 1.12, with a t-statistic of -1.86. For 
the Across-Class Upgrades portfolio, the mean beta fell from 
1.25 to 1.10, with a t-statistic of -1.94. Finally, the 
mean beta for the All Upgrades portfolio of 191 stocks fell 
from 1.23 to 1.12, with a t-statistic of -2.51.
Table 4.33 contains the results of the paired t-test 
for a rise in the mean portfolio beta following ranking 
changes for downgrades. Seven of the ten portfolios of 
downgrades had a rise in beta following ranking changes. 
However, only the A- to B+ portfolio had a statistically 
significant rise in beta. The A- to B+ beta rose from 1.02 
to 1.09, with a t-statistic of 1.76. The All Downgrades 
portfolio experienced only a slight, statistically 
insignificant, rise in beta from 1.07 to 1.09 following the 
memorandum date. However, the mean beta for the All 
Downgrades portfolio is lower than the mean beta for the All 
Upgrades portfolio, both before and after ranking changes.
The mean portfolio betas calculated for upgrades (table 
4.32) and downgrades (table 4.33) are combined in table 4.34
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to determine whether or not Standard & Poor's rankings are a 
good measure of risk as measured by beta. The left four 
columns of table 4.34 contain the data in tables 4.32 and 
4.33. Each row contains all possible combinations for that 
particular ranking. For example, consider the row for 
stocks ranked A. The second column is for pre-event 
upgrades, and the beta of 1.16 represents the portfolio of 
20 companies soon to be upgraded from A to A+ (table 4.32). 
The third column is for pre-event downgrades, and the beta 
of 1.05 represents the portfolio of 70 stocks which were 
subsequently downgraded from A to A- (table 4.33). The 
fourth column is for post-event upgrades, and the mean beta 
of 1.04 is for the 31 stocks following a ranking change from 
A- to A. In column five, post-event downgrades, the 
portfolio beta for stocks recently downgraded from A+ to A 
is 1.04. Column six contains the weighted-average of 
columns two and three, which is 1.07. Column seven contains 
the weighted-average of columns four and five, which is 
1.04. Column eight contains the weighted-average of columns 
two and four, which is 1.09, and column nine contains the 
weighted-average of columns three and five, which is 1.05. 
Finally, column ten contains the weighted-average for 
columns two, three, four, and five, which represents the 
mean beta for all stocks ranked A.
As reported in column ten of table 4.34, there is a 
close relation between Standard & Poor's common stock
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rankings and beta. Except for stocks ranked A-, there is a 
rise in beta for each lower ranking. The following betas 
(ranking) are found: 1.04 (A+), 1.06 (A), 1.03 (A-), 1.09
(B+) , 1.10 (B), 1.14 (B-), 1.21 (C), and 1.64 (D) .
4.7 Summary of Empirical Results
A Wall Street Journal Index search indicates that 
Standard & Poor's makes ranking changes subsequent to 
publicly released earnings announcements. The adjustment of 
stock returns differs by type of ranking change. Returns 
adjust prior to the memorandum date for the All Upgrades 
portfolio. However, a statistically significant positive 
AAR occurs on day 6. Thus, that customers of the Inter­
active Data Corporation may trade based on upgrades by 
Standard & Poor's cannot be ruled out, but the AAR on day 6 
may be the result of a relatively small sample size for 
upgrades. For the All Downgrades portfolio, stock returns 
are fully adjusted to earnings announcements on day 0. 
Therefore, a Standard & Poor's anomaly is not found.
Regression tests find that positive (negative) AARs 
prior to upgrades (downgrades) are not a function of firm 
size, which is consistent with findings of Huberman and 
Kandel [1987] for Value Line rankings. The measures of firm 
size used are total assets, sales, and market value.
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Companies with the initiation (NR to Ranking) or with­
drawal of a ranking (Ranking to NR) are examined. The 
Ranking to NR portfolio’s CAARs fall to -23.65% on day 9, 
while the NR to Ranking portfolio's CAARs are relatively 
stable. Also, the NR to High Ranking portfolio's mean beta 
falls from 1.02 to 0.75 following the memorandum date.
Rankings are found to be a good measure of risk as 
measured by both beta and standard deviation of returns, 
which is consistent with previous findings by Haugen [1979], 
Muller, Fielitz, and Greene [1983], and Muller and Fielitz 
[1987]. The close relation between rankings and risk is 
found both before and after ranking changes. Also, the 
rankings are not found to be a reliable measure of return, 
which is consistent with previous studies.
The results of a paired t-test indicate that mean port­
folio betas change following memorandum dates. For the All 
Upgrades portfolio, the mean beta fell from 1.23 to 1.12, 
which is statistically significant at a=.01 (one-tailed).
For the All Downgrades portfolio, the mean beta rose from
1.07 to 1.09, which is statistically insignificant.
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Table 4.1
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.04 0.77 0.04
(-40, -31) -0.08 -0.55 -0.04
(-30, -21) 0.05 0.65 0.01
(-20, -11) 0.05 0.35 0.06
-10 0.09 0.49 0.15
- 9 -0.05 -0.17 0.10
- 8 0.30 0.97 0.40
- 7 0.73 2.36* 1.13
- 6 -0.31 -0.83 0.82
- 5 0.03 0.37 0.85
- 4 -0.25 -0.46 0.60
- 3 -0.19 -0.54 0.41
- 2 -0.30 -0.80 0.11
- 1 0.27 0.89 0.38
0 0.29 0.86 0.67
1 0.48 2.05 1.15
2 0.09 0.12 1.24
3 -0.73 -1.90 0.51
4 -0.21 -0.45 0.30
5 0.11 0.31 0.41
6 0.57 2.13* 0.98
7 0.09 0.38 1.07
8 -0.75 -2.24* 0.32
9 0.52 1.20 0.84
10 -1.05 -3.09** -0.21
(11, 20) 0.09 0.54 -0.12
(21, 30) -0.14 -0.61 -0.26
(31, 40) 0.01 0.23 -0.25
(41, 50) -0.02 -0.25 -0.27
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.2
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.07 0.40 0.07
(-40, -31) 0.09 1.67 0.16
(-30, -21) -0.16 -2.13* 0.00
(-20, -11) -0.10 -0.93 -0.10
-10 -0.39 -1.46 -0.49
- 9 0.79 2.69* 0.30
- 8 0.27 0.79 0.57
- 7 -0.23 -0.79 0.34
- 6 0.26 0.65 0.60
- 5 0.50 2.08* 1.10
- 4 0.30 1.35 1.40
- 3 0.44 1.81 1.84
- 2 0.05 0.36 1.89
- 1 -0.19 -0.43 1.70
0 1 o o VO -0.21 1.61
1 0.39 1.08 2.00
2 0.01 0.13 2.01
3 0.01 -0.26 2.02
4 0.08 0.01 2.10
5 -0.08 -0.45 2.02
6 0.11 0.31 2.13
7 -0.47 -1.64 1.66
8 -0.22 -1.07 1.44
9 -0.40 -1.03 1.04
10 0.44 1.56 1.48
(11, 20) -0.10 -0.58 1.38(21, 30) -0.06 -0.51 1.32
(31, 40) 0.03 0.26 1.35
(41, 50) -0.02 -0.36 1.33
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table 4.3
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.20 1.38 0.20
(-40, -31) -0.21 -1.17 -0.01
(-30, -21) 0.01 0.45 0.00
(-20, -11) -0.03 -0.37 -0.03
-10 -0.32 -1.13 -0.35
- 9 0.54 1.29 0.19
- 8 0.19 0.81 0.38
- 7 -0.17 -0.63 0.21
- 6 0.37 0.89 0.58
- 5 0.21 0.48 0.79
- 4 -0.32 -0.46 0.47
- 3 -0.07 -0.40 0.40
- 2 -0.45 -1.46 -0.05
- 1 0.96 2.12* 0.91
0 0.37 0.83 1.28
1 -0.08 -0.29 1.20
2 -0.03 -0.09 1.17
3 -0.56 -1.43 0.61
4 -0.28 -0.62 0.33
5 -0.08 -0.51 0.25
6 0.32 0.95 0.57
7 0.09 0.23 0.66
8 0.24 0.42 0.90
9 0.46 1.05 1.36
10 -0.13 -0.50 1.23
(11, 20) 0.09 1.16 1.32
(21, 30) 0.02 0.01 1.34
(31, 40) -0.36 -2.52* 0.98
(41, 50) 0.12 0.96 1.10
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table 4.4
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 






Day (s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.13 -1.53 -0.13
(-40, -31) 0.05 1.71 -0.08
(-30, -21) 0.11 0.85 0.03
(-20, -11) 0.11 1.49 0.14
-10 -0.17 -0.97 -0.03
- 9 0.06 -0.04 0.03
- 8 -0.39 -0.92 -0.36
- 7 0.13 0.70 -0.23
- 6 0.47 1.35 0.24
- 5 -0.09 -0.45 0.15
- 4 0.33 1.25 0.48
- 3 0.27 1.18 0.75
- 2 0.37 0.49 1.12
- 1 0.53 1.13 1.65
0 -0.86 -2.21* 0.79
1 -0.37 -0.68 0.42
2 0.58 2.15* 1.00
3 -0.15 -0.17 0.85
4 -0.30 -0.86 0.55
5 0.33 0.87 0.88
6 0.42 1.28 1.30
7 0.26 0.67 1.56
8 0.23 1.26 1.79
9 0.39 0.84 2.18
10 0.00 0.16 2.18
(11, 20) 0.08 0.68 2.26
(21, 30) 0.02 0.38 2.28
(31, 40) 0.03 -0.18 2.31
(41, 50) -0.08 0.20 2.23
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table 4.5
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day (s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.02 0.23 0.02
(-40, -31) -0.02 1.10 0.00
(-30, -21) 0.01 -0.13 0.01
(-20, -11) 0.02 0.38 0.03
-10 -0.22 -1.65 -0.19
- 9 0.34 1.90 0.15
- 8 0.03 0.67 0.18
- 7 0.07 0.68 0.25
- 6 0.26 1.18 0.51
- 5 0.15 1.21 0.66
- 4 0.08 1.00 0.74
- 3 0.16 1.24 0.90
- 2 -0.01 -0.55 0.89
- 1 0.39 1.85 1.28
0 -0.19 -0.63 1.09
1 0.04 0.83 1.13
2 0.21 1.35 1.34
3 -0.30 -1.73 1.04
4 -0.18 -0.97 0.86
5 0.10 0.18 0.96
6 0.34 2.22* 1.30
7 0.00 -0.14 1.30
8 -0.05 -0.56 1.25
9 0.22 0.97 1.47
10 -0.09 -0.59 1.38
(11, 20) 0.04 0.88 1.42
(21, 30) -0.03 -0.30 1.39
(31, 40) -0.06 -1.06 1.33
(41, 50) -0.01 0.28 1.32
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table 4.6
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.01 -0.52 -0.01
(-40, -31) 0.07 1.25 0.06
(-30, -21) -0.02 -0.10 0.04
(-20, -11) 0.19 1.69 0.23
-10 -0.77 -1.34 -0.54
- 9 -0.08 0.07 -0.62
- 8 0.60 1.40 -0.02
- 7 0.40 1.33 0.38
- 6 0.11 0.48 0.49
- 5 0.40 1.66 0.89
- 4 0.29 0.98 1.18
- 3 0.70 1.66 1.88
- 2 0.58 1.65 2.46
- 1 -0.59 -1.42 1.87
0 0.06 0.35 1.93
1 0.23 -0.34 2.16
2 0.05 0.07 2.21
3 -0.48 -1.24 1.73
4 -0.59 -2.60* 1.14
5 0.09 0.44 1.23
6 -0.40 -1.32 0.83
7 0.23 0.83 1.06
8 0.63 2.12* 1.69
9 0.19 0.83 1.88
10 -0.18 -0.90 1.70
(10, 19) -0.04 -0.56 1.66
(20, 29) -0.04 -0.32 1.62
(30, 39) -0.08 -1.10 1.54
(40, 49) 0.04 0.24 1.58
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table 4.7
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and Hay 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.05 0.51 0.05
(-40, -31) -0.14 -0.73 -0.09
(-30, -21) -0.12 -1.26 -0.21
(-20, -11) 0.00 0.48 -0.21
-10 -0.40 -0.41 -0.61
- 9 0.21 1.47 -0.40
- 8 0.74 1.30 0.34
- 7 0.78 2.33* 1.12
- 6 -0.01 0.02 1.11
- 5 -0.48 -0.72 0.63
- 4 0.08 0.13 0.71
- 3 0.89 2.79“ 1.60
- 2 1.70 3.67“ 3.30
- 1 -0.11 -0.63 3.19
0 0H1 -2.63* 2.15
1 -0.28 -0.59 1.87
2 -0.57 -1.20 1.30
3 -0.01 0.76 1.29
4 -0.08 0.09 1.21
5 -0.30 -0.99 0.91
6 1.03 2.78“ 1.94
7 -0.52 -0.88 1.42
8 0.15 -0.01 1.57
9 -0.52 -1.26 1.05
10 1.37 2.89“ 2.42
(11, 20) 0.02 0.23 2.44
(21, 30) 0.05 1.44 2.49
(31, 40) -0.12 -1.47 2.37
(41, 50) -0.01 -0.17 2.36
‘Significant at a=.05 “ Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.8
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.01 -0.01 0.01
(-40, -31) 0.06 0.15 0.07
(-30, -21) -0.06 -0.90 0.01
(-20, -11) 0.08 1.44 0.09
-10 -0.57 -1.22 -0.48
- 9 0.08 1.17 -0.40
- 8 0.73 1.98 0.33
- 7 0.75 2.88^ 1.08
- 6 -0.05 0.13 1.03
- 5 -0.13 0.48 0.90
- 4 0.17 0.71 1.07
- 3 0.76 3.11^ 1.83
- 2 1.28 3.91^ 3.11
- 1 -0.25 -1.28 2.86
0 CO(O01 -1.78 2.28
1 -0.15 -0.81 2.13
2 -0.41 -1.05 1.72
3 -0.17 -0.12 1.55
4 -0.27 -1.50 1.28
5 -0.14 -0.47 1.14
6 0.50 1.40 1.64
7 -0.29 -0.31 1.35
8 0.28 1.19 1.63
9 -0.21 -0.40 1.42
10 0.86 1.89 2.28
(11, 20) -0.02 -0.25 2.26
(21, 30) 0.02 0.94 2.28
(31, 40) -0.11 -1.86 2.17
(41, 50) 0.00 -0.02 2.17
♦♦Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.9
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.02 0.20 0.02
(-40, -31) -0.03 0.95 -0.01
(-30, -21) -0.02 -0.67 -0.03
(-20, -11) 0.04 1.16 0.01
-10 -0.35 -2.06* -0.34
- 9 0.24 2.22* -0.10
- 8 0.30 1.74 0.20
- 7 0.33 2.35* 0.53
- 6 0.14 0.99 0.67
- 5 0.04 1.24 0.71
- 4 0.11 1.23 0.82
- 3 0.39 2.87** 1.21
- 2 0.49 1.97* 1.70
- 1 0.15 0.65 1.85
0 -0.34 -1.57 1.51
1 -0.04 0.13 1.47
2 -0.03 0.43 1.44
3 -0.25 -1.42 1.19
4 -0.21 -1.69 0.98
5 0.01 -0.16 0.99
6 0.40 2.61** 1.39
7 -0.11 -0.37 1.28
8 0.08 0.32 1.36
9 0.05 0.50 1.41
10 0.28 0.68 1.69
(11, 20) 0.02 0.49 1.71
(21, 30) -0.01 0.34 1.70
(31, 40) -0.08 -1.98* 1.62
(41, 50) 0.00 0.17 1.62
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.10
Frequency of confounding events reported in the Wall Street 
Journal Index from day -5 to day 5 for common stocks up­
graded by Standard & Poor’s between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 
1987. Event day 0 is the Standard & Poor's memorandum date.
Event Day
Confounding
Event -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 T.
Net Income 0 5 10 20 82 69 0 0 0 0 0 186
Dividend 1 3 2 6 4 3 0 2 2 0 0 23
Stock Split 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 5
New Director 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 3
Takeover 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Miscellaneous 
Positive News
0 3 1 2 4 2 0 1 2 2 1 18
Total 2 11 13 28 91 75 2 5 6 2 2 237
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
77
Table 4.11
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.24 -2.26* -0.24
(-40, -31) -0.13 -1.10 -0.37
(-30, -21) -0.13 -1.81 -0.50
(-20, -11) -0.07 -0.64 -0.57
-10 0.05 0.46 -0.52
- 9 -0.48 -1.24 -1.00
- 8 0.03 0.49 -0.97
- 7 -0.34 -1.28 -1.31
- 6 -0.88 -3.38** -2.19
- 5 -0.68 -2.26* -2.87
- 4 0.46 2.08* -2.41
- 3 -0.28 -0.86 -2.69
- 2 -0.80 -2.28* -3.49
- 1 -0.67 -2.49* -4.16
0 -0.43 -2.02* -4.59
1 -0.26 -0.33 -4.85
2 -0.43 -1.15 -5.28
3 -0.24 -0.38 -5.52
4 -0.10 -0.17 -5.62
5 -0.20 -0.57 -5.82
6 0.44 1.52 -5.38
7 -0.50 -1.53 -5.88
8 -0.36 -1.16 -6.24
9 -0.29 -0.63 -6.53
10 0.12 1.09 -6.41
(11, 20) -0.21 -1.88 -6.62
(21, 30) -0.05 -0.34 -6.67
(31, 40) -0.04 -0.56 -6.71
(41, 50) -0.12 -1.23 -6.83
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at a=.0l
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Table 4.12
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day (s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.05 1.11 0.05
(-40, -31) 0.03 0.45 0.08
(-30, -21) -0.08 -1.11 0.00
(-20, -11) -0.11 -1.68 -0.11-10 0.18 0.76 0.07
- 9 -0.07 -0.33 0.00
- 8 0.37 1.99 0.37
- 7 0.06 0.72 0.43
- 6 -0.33 -1.52 0.10
- 5 -0.23 -0.88 -0.13
- 4 0.08 1.09 -0.05
- 3 -0.04 -0.15 -0.09
- 2 0.13 0.39 0.04
- 1 0.06 0.86 0.10
0 0.10 0.80 0.20
1 0.05 0.19 0.25
2 0.31 1.56 0.56
3 -0.13 -0.78 0.43
4 -0.09 -0.27 0.34
5 0.28 1.72 0.62
6 -0.35 -2.00* 0.27
7 -0.11 -0.07 0.16
8 0.03 -0.39 0.19
9 0.00 -0.31 0.19
10 0.14 1.37 0.33
(11, 20) -0.11 -1.45 0.22(21, 30) 0.01 0.24 0.23
(31, 40) 0.04 0.00 0.27
(41, 50) -0.11 -1.50 0.16
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table 4.13
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.13 -1.97* -0.13
(-40, -31) 0.03 0.78 -0.10
(-30, -21) -0.04 0.01 -0.14
(-20, -11) -0.01 0.12 -0.15
-10 0.26 2.09* 0.11
- 9 0.06 1.64 0.17
- 8 -0.25 -0.93 -0.08
- 7 -0.32 -2.07* -0.40
- 6 0.13 1.37 -0.27
- 5 -0.04 -0.30 -0.31
- 4 0.07 1.81 -0.24
- 3 0.29 1.71 0.05
- 2 -0.59 -3.79** -0.54
- 1 -0.20 -0.42 -0.74
0 0.20 1.38 -0.54
1 -0.12 -1.39 -0.66
2 0.10 0.83 -0.56
3 0.33 3.25** -0.23
4 0.15 1.45 -0.08
5 -0.08 -1.15 -0.16
6 0.18 0.95 0.02
7 0.09 0.58 0.11
8 -0.44 -2.62** -0.33
9 -0.26 -1.65 -0.59
10 -0.12 -1.05 -0.71
(11, 20) -0.07 -1.36 -0.78
(21, 30) 0.10 1.27 -0.68
(31, 40) -0.01 0.14 -0.69
(41, 50) 0.05 1.13 -0.64
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.14
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.03 -0.14 -0.03
(-40, -31) -0.02 -0.20 -0.05
(-30, -21) 0.08 1.18 0.03
(-20, -11) 0.01 0.24 0.04
-10 -0.26 -0.56 -0.22
- 9 0.53 1.84 0.31
- 8 0.36 1.76 0.67
- 7 -0.09 -0.22 0.58
- 6 0.07 1.30 0.65
- 5 -0.25 -1.14 0.40
- 4 -0.28 -1.38 0.12
- 3 -0.26 -1.05 -0.14
- 2 -0.58 -1.50 -0.72
- 1 -0.84 -3.91^ -1.56
0 0.05 -0.38 -1.51
1 0.75 3.33^ -0.76
2 0.11 0.77 -0.65
3 -0.07 -0.62 -0.72
4 -0.21 -0.16 -0.93
5 -0.05 -0.08 -0.98
6 0.23 1.62 -0.75
7 0.22 0.48 -0.53
8 -0.35 -1.38 -0.88
9 0.36 0.51 -0.52
10 -0.13 -0.37 -0.65
(11, 20) 0.09 1.39 -0.56
(21, 30) 0.01 0.01 -0.55
(31, 40) -0.08 -0.90 -0.63
(41, 50) -0.02 -0.61 -0.65
♦♦Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.15
Dally average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.07 -1.46 -0.07
(-40, -31) 0.00 -0.05 -0.07
(-30, -21) -0.01 -0.35 -0.08
(-20, -11) -0.03 -0.78 -0.11
-10 0.04 1.28 -0.07
- 9 0.16 1.33 0.09
- 8 0.11 1.32 0.20
- 7 -0.17 -1.49 0.03
- 6 -0.07 -0.18 -0.04
- 5 -0.21 -2.16* -0.25
- 4 -0.02 1.26 -0.27
- 3 -0.02 0.08 -0.29
- 2 -0.48 -3.52** -0.77
- 1 -0.43 -3.13** -1.20
0 0.07 0.12 -1.13
1 0.22 1.10 -0.91
2 0.09 1.21 -0.82
3 0.05 1.11 -0.77
4 -0.05 0.54 -0.82
5 -0.01 -0.34 -0.83
6 0.12 1.16 -0.71
7 0.05 0.03 -0.66
8 -0.31 -2.94** -0.97
9 0.01 -1.11 -0.96
10 -0.06 0.07 -1.02
(11, 20) -0.03 -1.31 -1.05
(21, 30) 0.04 0.55 -1.01
(31, 40) -0.03 -0.91 -1.04
(41, 50) -0.02 -0.81 -1.06
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at o=.01
Reproduced w ith perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
82
Table 4.16
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.04 0.81 0.04
(-40, -31) -0.09 -1.76 -0.05
("30, -21) -0.08 -1.19 -0.13
(-20, -11) -0.03 -0.88 -0.16-10 0.12 0.51 -0.04
- 9 -0.05 -0.68 -0.09
- 8 -0.15 -0.81 -0.24
- 7 0.06 0.20 -0.18
- 6 -0.11 -1.08 -0.29
- 5 -0.24 -0.95 -0.53
- 4 0.10 0.75 -0.43
- 3 -0.17 -1.09 -0.60
- 2 0.03 0.52 -0.57
- 1 0.10 0.52 -0.47
0 -0.28 -1.16 1 o 171
1 0.14 0.78 -0.61
2 0.18 1.41 -0.43
3 -0.15 -0.85 -0.58
4 -0.09 -0.58 -0.67
5 -0.01 -0.11 -0.68
6 0.28 1.47 -0.40
7 -0.10 -0.59 -0.50
8 -0.05 0.03 -0.55
9 -0.21 -1.46 -0.76
10 -0.12 -0.44 -0.88
(11, 20) -0.05 -1.01 -0.93(21, 30) -0.16 -3.24** -1.09
(31, 40) -0.10 -1.68 -1.19
(41, 50) -0.02 -1.03 -1.21
*‘Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.17
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June l, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.16 -1.57 -0.16
(-40, -31) -0.16 -0.89 -0.32
(-30, -21) -0.16 -0.15 -0.48
(-20, -11) -0.15 -0.95 -0.63
-10 0.04 0.75 -0.59
- 9 -0.80 -1.29 -1.39
- 8 -0.01 1.47 -1.40
- 7 0.20 0.35 -1.20
- 6 -0.03 -0.02 -1.23
- 5 -0.32 -0.89 -1.55
- 4 0.08 0.49 -1.47
- 3 -0.21 -0.60 -1.68
- 2 -0.12 -0.67 -1.80
- 1 -0.99 -2.47* -2.79
0 -0.59 -1.23 -3.38
1 -0.17 -0.47 -3.55
2 0.05 -0.32 -3.50
3 0.48 1.35 -3.02
4 0.78 1.80 -2.24
5 -0.10 -0.38 -2.34
6 0.01 0.39 -2.33
7 -0.35 -0.21 -2.68
8 0.79 1.77 -1.89
9 0.55 1.52 -1.34
10 0.41 1.29 -0.93
(11, 20) -0.03 -0.16 -0.96
(21, 30) 0.14 1.40 -0.82
(31, 40) -0.03 0.53 -0.85
(41, 50) 0.15 2.01* -0.70
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table 4.18
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) - 0.32 - 0.40 - 0.32
(-40, -31) - 1.53 - 1.52 - 1.85
(-30, -21) - 0.40 - 0.46 - 2.25
(-20, -11) - 0.68 - 0.78 - 2.93
-10 - 1.49 - 0.45 - 4.42
- 9 1.33 0.45 - 3.09
- 8 - 2.74 - 0.75 - 5.83
- 7 - 4.76 - 1.56 -10.59
- 6 0.69 - 0.22 - 9.90
- 5 0.66 0.42 - 9.24
- 4 - 3.15 - 0.78 -12.39
- 3 0.14 0.19 -12.25
- 2 4.47 1.47 - 7.78
- 1 -29.55 -10.62^ -37.33
0 - 0.19 1.27 -37.52
1 - 2.14 - 0.38 -39.66
2 3.78 1.38 -35.88
3 - 3.38 - 0.80 -39.26
4 - 2.43 - 0.37 -41.69
5 0.28 0.00 -41.41
6 1.72 0.15 -39.69
7 1.14 0.29 -38.55
8 - 0.51 - 0.23 -39.06
9 - 4.51 - 1.40 -43.57
10 - 1.11 - 0.35 -44.68
(11, 20) 0.41 0.15 -44.27
(21, 30) - 0.17 - 0.28 -44.44
(31, 40) - 0.05 - 0.14 -44.49
(41, 50) 0.75 0.66 -43.74
♦♦Significant at ct=.01
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Table 4.19
Dally average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and dally 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June l, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.06 -0.56 -0.06
(-40, -31) -0.15 -2.08* -0.21
(-30, -21) -0.12 -1.70 -0.33
(-20, -11) -0.10 -1.38 -0.43
-10 0.05 0.82 -0.38
- 9 -0.38 -1.31 -0.76
- 8 -0.13 0.32 -0.89
- 7 0.03 0.17 -0.86
- 6 -0.06 -0.81 -0.92
- 5 -0.26 -1.23 -1.18
- 4 0.03 0.76 -1.15
- 3 -0.18 -1.16 -1.33
- 2 0.04 0.11 -1.29
- 1 -1.01 -2.82** -2.30
0 1 O 4* to -1.49 -2.72
1 -0.05 0.18 -2.77
2 0.19 0.98 -2.58
3 0.08 0.21 -2.50
4 0.28 0.77 -2.22
5 -0.05 -0.34 -2.27
6 0.18 1.33 -2.09
7 -0.20 -0.53 -2.29
8 0.34 1.20 -1.95
9 0.06 -0.19 -1.89
10 0.11 0.52 -1.78
(11, 20) -0.03 -0.81 -1.81(21, 30) -0.02 -1.34 -1.83
(31, 40) -0.06 -0.85 -1.89
(41, 50) 0.08 0.75 -1.81
♦Significant at c=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.20
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.07 -1.78 -0.07
(-40, -31) -0.05 -1.12 -0.12
(-30, -21) -0.05 -1.48 -0.17
(-20, -11) -0.05 -1.48 -0.22
-10 0.04 1.69 -0.18
- 9 -0.02 0.39 -0.20
- 8 0.03 1.27 -0.17
- 7 -0.10 -1.08 -0.27
- 6 -0.06 -0.69 -0.33
- 5 -0.23 -2.49* -0.56
- 4 -0.01 1.47 -0.57
- 3 -0.08 -0.67 -0.65
- 2 -0.30 -3.03** -0.95
- 1 -0.63 -4.12** -1.58
0 0 HO1 -0.91 -1.68
1 0.13 1.01 -1.55
2 0.13 1.63 -1.42
3 0.06 0.91 -1.36
4 0.06 0.66 -1.30
5 -0.03 -0.32 -1.33
6 0.14 1.81 -1.19
7 -0.03 -0.30 -1.22
8 -0.09 -1.74 -1.31
9 0.03 -1.08 -1.28
10 0.00 0.33 -1.28
(11, 20) -0.03 -1.48 -1.31
(21, 30) 0.02 -0.42 -1.29
(31, 40) -0.04 -1.08 -1.33
(41, 50) 0.01 -0.22 -1.32
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.21
Frequency of confounding events reported in the Wall Street 
Journal Index from day -5 to day 5 for common stocks down­
graded by Standard & Poor's between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 
1987. Event day 0 is the Standard & Poor's memorandum date.
Event Day
Confounding
Event -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 T.
Net Income 0 3 24 37 139 84 0 0 2 0 0 289
Net Loss 1 11 37 55 104 69 0 1 1 0 0 279
Dividend 2 6 7 8 7 18 4 9 2 1 5 69
Dividend Cut 2 2 8 5 7 6 4 6 4 1 3 48
New Director 0 0 0 4 10 2 9 4 3 1 0 33
Takeover 1 3 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 10
Miscellaneous 
Negative News
8 4 6 3 12 9 12 8 7 7 12 88
Total 14 29 83 112 279 189 31 28 19 11 21 816
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Table 4.22
Regression tests for firm-size effect on abnormal returns. 
Dependent variable is cumulative average abnormal return for 
each company for days -3, -2, and -1. Sample of 168 up­
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Table 4.23
Regression tests for firm-size effect on abnormal returns. 
Dependent variable is cumulative average abnormal return for 
each company for days -3, -2, and -1. Sample of 493 down­
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Table 4.24
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0
is the Standard & Poor's memorandum date.
Ranking to NR 
n=9
Event 
Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.33 0.93 0.33
(-40, -31) -0.14 -0.36 0.19
(-30, -21) -0.47 -0.79 - 0.28
(-20, -11) 0.25 -0.87 - 0.03
-10 -0.83 -1.50 - 0.86
- 9 0.15 0.97 - 0.71
- 8 -1.35 -0.10 - 2.06
- 7 -0.17 0.07 - 2.23
- 6 -0.13 -0.32 - 2.36
- 5 0.40 1.31 - 1.96
- 4 -1.17 -0.58 - 3.13
- 3 -0.83 -0.89 - 3.96
- 2 -4.12 -2.49* - 8.08
- 1 -5.90 -5.55** -13.98
0 -3.84 -3.78** -17.82
1 2.06 0.93 -15.76
2 -1.04 -0.12 -16.80
3 1.52 1.74 -15.28
4 0.23 0.99 -15.05
5 -1.47 -1.03 -16.52
6 -2.31 -3.51** -18.83
7 -1.18 -2.17 -20.01
8 -3.54 -4.83** -23.55
9 -0.08 -0.33 -23.63
10 0.41 0.39 -23.22
(11, 20) 0.27 0.16 -22.95
(21, 30) 0.02 1.00 -22.93
(31, 40) 0.25 0.67 -22.68
(41, 50) 0.26 0.63 -22.42
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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Table 4.25
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and Hay 30, 1987. Event day 0 
is the Standard & Poor's memorandum date.




A, A-, B+) 
8)
Event
Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.11 -0.37 -0.11
(-40, -31) 0.08 0.19 -0.03
("30, -21) -0.13 -0.58 -0.16
(-20, -11) 0.08 0.29 -0.08-10 -0.47 -1.00 -0.55
- 9 0.49 0.07 -0.06
- 8 -0.29 -0.72 -0.35
- 7 -0.22 -0.80 -0.57
- 6 0.18 0.40 -0.39
- 5 -0.25 -0.18 -0.64
- 4 0.14 0.23 -0.50
- 3 -0.93 -1.43 -1.43
- 2 0.22 0.32 -1.21
- 1 -0.39 -0.29 -1.60
0 0.51 0.52 -1.09
1 0.27 0.47 -0.82
2 -0.76 -0.51 -1.58
3 -1.21 -1.62 -2.79
4 -0.78 -1.22 -3.57
5 -0.06 -0.56 -3.63
6 -1.52 -2.23 -5.15
7 0.11 0.19 -5.04
8 0.57 0.68 -4.47
9 0.75 1.05 -3.72
10 -0.71 -1.00 -4.43
(11, 20) -0.27 -1.67 -4.70(21, 30) 0.18 0.93 -4.52
(31, 40) -0.15 -1.09 -4.67
(41, 50) -0.16 -1.17 -4.83
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Table 4.26
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 
is the Standard & Poor's memorandum date.
NR to Low Ranking (B, 
n=33 (14, 3, 14
B-, C, D) 
, 2)
Event
Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.23 -1.54 -0.23
(-40, -31) 0.16 0.56 -0.07
(-30, -21) -0.01 0.17 -0.08
(-20, -11) 0.04 -0.71 -0.04
-10 0.60 1.16 0.56
- 9 -0.11 -0.27 0.45
- 8 -0.66 -1.13 -0.21
- 7 -0.47 -0.49 -0.68
- 6 0.24 0.90 -0.44
- 5 -0.45 -0.64 -0.89
- 4 1.41 2.43* 0.52
- 3 0.29 0.69 0.81
- 2 -0.14 -0.19 0.67
- 1 -0.74 -1.19 -0.07
0 -0.55 -0.96 1 o « a\ to
1 0.91 0.80 0.29
2 -0.45 -0.95 -0.16
3 -0.70 -1.22 -0.86
4 0.17 0.25 -0.69
5 0.45 1.21 -0.24
6 -0.08 0.11 -0.32
7 0.13 1.20 -0.19
8 -1.20 -2.16 -1.39
9 0.86 -0.42 -0.53
10 0.82 1.98 0.29
(11, 20) -0.05 -0.59 0.24
(21, 30) 0.13 0.23 0.37
(31, 40) -0.09 0.07 0.28
(41, 50) 0.29 1.78 0.57
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table 4.27
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.20 -1.54 -0.20
(-40, -31) 0.14 0.58 -0.06
(-30, -21) -0.03 -0.12 -0.09
(-20, -11) 0.05 -0.50 -0.04
-10 0.37 0.57 0.33
- 9 0.02 -0.21 0.35
- 8 -0.45 -1.34 -0.10
- 7 -0.42 -0.80 -0.52
- 6 0.22 0.98 -0.30
- 5 -0.40 -0.65 -0.70
- 4 1.13 2.26* 0.43
- 3 0.03 -0.05 0.46
- 2 -0.06 -0.02 0.40
- 1 -0.67 -1.19 -0.27
0 -0.32 -0.61 -0.59
1 0.77 0.92 0.18
2 -0.52 -1.07 -0.34
3 -0.81 -1.84 -1.15
4 -0.03 -0.34 -1.18
5 0.34 0.81 -0.84
6 -0.39 -0.93 -1.23
7 0.12 1.15 -1.11
8 -0.82 -1.60 -1.93
9 0.83 0.11 -1.10
10 0.49 1.29 -0.61
(11, 20) -0.10 -1.29 -0.71
(21, 30) 0.15 0.64 -0.56
(31, 40) -0.10 -0.45 -0.66
(41, 50) 0.19 1.04 0.47
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table 4.28
Portfolio return and standard deviation of return for firms 
with the initiation or ending of a Standard & Poor's common 
stock ranking between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Firms 
grouped by type of ranking change before and after event day 
0, which is the Standard & Poor's memorandum date. Figures
are in percent.
50 Days Before Event 50 Days After Event
Portfolio n Return SD Return SD
Ranking to 
No Ranking
9 -17.32 3.99 -0.86 3.53
No Ranking to 
High Ranking
9 3.12 1.74 -4.82 1.94
No Ranking to 
Low Ranking
33 6.85 3.95 5.37 3.68
No Ranking to 
Ranking
42 6.05 3.49 3.19 3.34
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Table 4.29
Paired t-test for a change in the mean portfolio beta from a 
pre-event period (days -250 to -51) to a post-event period 
(days 51 to 250) for companies with the following common 
stock ranking initiation or ending by Standard & Poor's from 



































♦♦Significant at a=.01 (two-tailed test)
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Table 4.30
Sample of companies which lost their Standard & Poor's com­
mon stock rankings (Ranking to NR) during the period from 






Kansas Gas & Electric August 1985 A- to NR
Middle South Utilities August 1985 A- to NR
FMC Corporation June 1986 A- to NR
Gulf States Utility June 1986 A- to NR
Duquesne Light August 1986 A- to NR
Matrix Corporation September 1985 B+ to NR
Koger Properties August 1985 B to NR
Owens-Corning Fiberglas November 1986 B to NR
Cook United October 1986 D to NR
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Table 4.31
Portfolio return and standard deviation of return for firms 
with a Standard & Poor's ranking change between June 1, 1985 
and May 30, 1987. Firms grouped by type of ranking change 
before and after event day 0, which is the Standard & Poor's 
memorandum date. Figures are in percent.
50 Days Before Event 50 Days After Event
Portfolio n Return SD Return SD
A to A+ 20 11.27 1.68 8.05 1.79
A- to A 31 8.56 1.53 8.41 1.75
B+ to A- 27 11.99 2.03 7.81 1.85
B to B+ 26 7.36 2.13 3.93 2.17
B- to B 40 8.50 2.55 4.39 2.51



















A+ to A 33 2.33 1.72 5.60 1.73
A to A- 70 8.26 1.76 5.72 1.88
A- to B+ 102 6.02 1.80 4.77 1.94
B+ to B 138 5.43 2.35 6.36 2.46
B to B- 140 4.49 3.20 5.99 3.07
B- to C 95 0.99 4.09 7.97 3.94
C to D 4 -52.24 7.71 17.17 7.73
Within-Class 381 5.33 2.57 6.04 2.56
Across-Class 201 2.48 3.28 6.53 3.23
All Downgrades 582 4.35 2.83 6.21 2.81
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Table 4.32
Paired t-test for a fall in the mean portfolio beta from a 
pre-event period (days -250 to -51) to a post-event period 
(days 51 to 250) for companies with the following common 



























































♦Significant at a=.05 (one-tailed test) 
**Significant at a=.01 (one-tailed test)
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Table 4.33
Paired t-test for a rise in the mean portfolio beta from a 
pre-event period (days -250 to -51) to a post-event period 
(days 51 to 250) for companies with the following common 
































































♦Significant at a=.05 (one-tailed test)
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Table 4.34
Mean betas and the number of securities for various port­
folios of common stocks with a ranking change between June 
1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. The pre-event period is days 
-250 to -51, and the post-even period is days 51 to 250.
Pre--Event Post--Event






































































































































































































This chapter provides a summary and conclusions of this 
study. Section 5.2 describes the motivation for research, 
related literature, and the objective of this dissertation. 
Section 5.3 briefly describes the research methodology 
employed. In section 5.4, empirical results are summarized, 
and the contributions of this research to the literature are 
assessed. Finally, recommendations for future research are 
made in section 5.5.
5.2 Objective of Dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the 
information content of common stock ranking changes made by 
the Standard & Poor's Corporation. These rankings are 
derived from a system developed by Standard & Poor's which 
begins with a computer-generated score based on per-share 
growth, stability, and cyclicality of earnings and dividends 
for the most recent ten years of available data. Standard & 
Poor's then adjusts the scores based on firm size, sales
Reproduced with perm ission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
102
volume, "relative current standing," and special considera­
tions. Many companies' stocks are not ranked due to either 
insufficient data or uncertainty about future earnings.
Changes in rankings are made daily by Standard &
Poor's. A ranking change can be either an upgrade, a down­
grade, the initiation of a ranking, or the withdrawal of a 
ranking. Ranking changes are first released by internal 
memoranda. The memoranda are then mailed to the Interactive 
Data Corporation, which provides the information to its 
customers. Finally, the ranking changes are published at 
the end of the month in the Stock Guide.
The central question which this dissertation addresses 
is whether or not Standard & Poor's ranking changes contain 
information which is not already incorporated in security 
prices. Following Stickel [1986], an argument can be 
presented for both sides of the question. On one hand, a 
security price response upon the release of the rankings is 
expected due to standard & Poor's reputation as a provider 
of valuable information. On the other hand, the rankings 
may be only summary statistics which do not affect prices.
Previous studies by Haugen [1979], Muller, Fielitz, and 
Greene [1983, 1984], and Muller and Fielitz [1987] find 
information content in Standard & Poor's common stock 
rankings. These studies find that Standard & Poor's 
rankings are a good measure of risk, but they do not examine 
Standard & Poor's ranking changes. This study is motivated
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in part by the failure of these studies to examine ranking 
changes for information content.
A closely related area, the information content of 
Value Line recommendations, has been studied extensively. 
Studies by Black [1971], Holloway [1981], and Copeland and 
Mayers [1982] find that stocks ranked high in the Value Line 
Investment Survey outperform stocks ranked low, even after 
making adjustments for risk. However, the debate concerning 
Value Line's ability to outperform the market, the Value 
Line Anomaly, is unresolved. Stickel [1985] tests Value 
Line ranking changes for information content and finds a 
portfolio price adjustment which lasts for approximately 
three days subsequent to the public release of Value Line 
ranking changes. This study parallels Stickel [1985] by 
examining the portfolio price adjustment to Standard &
Poor's common stock ranking changes.
5.3 Research Methodology
This study employs event study methodology, which 
models expected security returns, then computes the 
deviation of actual returns from expected returns and the 
statistical significance of the deviation. The market model 
is used to estimate the benchmark expected return.
Common stock ranking changes made by standard & Poor's
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during the two-year period from June 1, 1985 to May 30,
1987, and published in the Stock Guide from July 1985 to 
June 1987, are examined. During this period, 1,879 common 
stock ranking changes were made by Standard & Poor's, and 
824 ranking changes are examined in this dissertation. 
Memoranda containing daily ranking changes during this two- 
year period of study were obtained by request from the 
Standard & Poor's Corporation.
5.4 Summary and Contribution of Empirical Findings
A Wall Street Journal Index search indicates that 
Standard & Poor's makes ranking changes subsequent to the 
public release of corporate earnings. Empirical results 
refute the existence of a Standard & Poor's anomaly.
Security prices adjust upon the release of corporate earn­
ings in the Wall Street Journal, prior to ranking changes, 
which is consistent with market efficiency. An exception 
occurs with the All Upgrades portfolio six days after the 
memorandum date. However, the aberration is not considered 
meaningful since it is probably the result of the relatively 
small sample size of the All Upgrades portfolio.26
26 The All Upgrades portfolio of 191 stocks is small 
relative to the All Downgrades portfolio (582). The Within- 
Class Downgrades portfolio (381) has a statistically signi­
ficant negative AAR on day 8, but it loses significance when 
the Across-Class Downgrades portfolio (201) is added.
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Standard & Poor's common stock rankings are found to be 
a reliable measure of risk, both before and after a ranking 
change, with few exceptions, a higher ranking indicates 
lower risk, as measured by both beta and standard deviation 
of returns. The rankings are not found to be a reliable 
measure of return, both before and after ranking changes.
Since this study concurs with previous findings of a 
close relation between Standard & Poor's common stock 
rankings and risk, a test is made to determine whether a 
ranking change indicates a change in risk. The mean port­
folio beta for days -250 to -50 is compared with the mean 
portfolio beta for days 51 to 250. For the All Upgrades 
portfolio, the a priori expectation is for the mean port­
folio beta to fall, indicating less risk following an 
upgrade. Using a paired t-test, a statistically significant 
fall in the mean beta occurs for the All Upgrades portfolio, 
from 1.23 to 1.12. For the All Downgrades portfolio, the a 
priori expectation is for the mean portfolio beta to rise, 
indicating more risk following a downgrade. The mean 
portfolio beta rises for the All Downgrades portfolio from 
1.07 to 1.09.
In conclusion, this study makes significant contribu­
tions to the literature. A Standard & Poor's anomaly is not 
found. Investors cannot earn abnormal returns by trading 
securities based on Standard & Poor's common stock ranking 
changes. No relation between rankings and returns is found,
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and information is fully incorporated in security prices 
prior to ranking changes. However, rankings nay be used as 
a measure of market risk. With few exceptions, a higher 
ranking indicates lower risk. Furthermore, a ranking change 
indicates a change in risk.
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research
Standard & Poor's common stock rankings, which are 
closely related to risk, are based almost entirely on 
publicly-available ten-year histories of corporate earnings 
and dividends. Standard & Poor's common stock ranking 
changes, which indicate a change in risk, are made in 
response to changes in earnings and dividends. Thus, public 
announcements of earnings and dividends may contain infor­
mation regarding future market risk. Additional research of 
the relation between risk and announcements of earnings and 
dividends may be useful in trying to predict future market 
risk. However, Standard & Poor's common stock ranking 
changes may provide portfolio managers with a low-cost 
method for predicting future betas. In their attempt to 
maintain portfolio risk at its desired level, portfolio 
managers may be able to employ ranking changes as a means 
for adjusting portfolios before changes in risk occur.
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Appendix A
Description of the Standard & Poor's 
Common Stock Rankings 
rStock Guide!
The investment process involves assessment of various 
factors - such as product and industry position, corporate 
resources and financial policy - with results that make some 
common stocks more highly esteemed than others. In this 
assessment, Standard & Poor's believes that earnings and 
dividend performance is the end result of the interplay of 
these factors and that, over the long run, the record of 
this performance has a considerable bearing on relative 
quality. The rankings, however, do not pretend to reflect 
all of the factors, tangible or intangible, that bear on 
stock quality.
Relative quality of bonds or other debt, that is, 
degrees of protection for principal and interest, called 
creditworthiness, cannot be applied to common stocks, and 
therefore rankings are not to be confused with bond quality 
ratings which are arrived at by a necessarily different 
approach.
Growth and stability of earnings and dividends are 
deemed key elements in establishing Standard & Poor's 
earnings and dividend rankings for common stocks, which are 
designed to capsulize the nature of this record in a single 
symbol. It should be noted, however, that the process also 
takes into consideration certain adjustments and 
modifications deemed desirable in establishing such 
rankings.
The point of departure in arriving at these rankings is 
a computerized scoring system based on per-share earnings 
and dividend records of the most recent ten years - a period 
deemed long enough to measure significant time segments of 
secular growth, to capture indications of basic change in 
trend as they develop, and to encompass the full peak-to- 
peak range of the business cycle. Basic scores are computed 
for earnings and dividends, then adjusted as indicated by a 
set of predetermined modifiers for growth, stability with 
long-term trend, and cyclicality. Adjusted scores for 
earnings and dividends are then combined to yield a final 
score.
Further, the ranking system makes allowance for the 
fact that, in general, corporate size imparts certain 
recognized advantages from an investment standpoint. 
Conversely, minimum size limits (in terms of corporate sales 
volume) are set for the various rankings, but the system 
provides for making exceptions where the score reflects an 
outstanding eamings-dividend record.
The final score for each stock is measured against a
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scoring matrix determined by analysis of the scores of a 
large and representative sample of stocks. The range of 
scores in the array of this sample has been aligned with the 
following ladder of rankings:
A+ Highest B+ Average c Lowest
A High B Below Average D In Reorganization
A- Above Average B- Lower
NR signifies no ranking because of insufficient data or 
because the stock is not amenable to the ranking process.
The positions as determined above may be modified in 
some instances by special considerations, such as natural 
disasters, massive strikes, and non-recurring accounting 
adjustments.
A ranking is not a forecast of future market price 
performance, but is basically an appraisal of past 
performance of earnings and dividends, and relative current 
standing. These rankings must not be used as market 
recommendations; a high-score stock may at times be so 
overpriced as to justify its sale, while a low-score stock 
may be attractively priced for purchase. Rankings based 
upon earnings and dividend records are no substitute for 
complete analysis. They cannot take into account potential 
effects of management changes, internal company policies not 
yet fully reflected in the earnings and dividend record, 
public relations standing, recent competitive shifts, and a 
host of other factors that may be relevant to investment 
status and decision.
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Appendix B
Description of the Moody's, Value Line, and 
Financial World Common Stock Rankings
Moody's Common Stock Rankings 
TMoodv's Handbook of Common stocks1
MOODY'S COMMENT is a concise statement of the important 
characteristics of the company plus our evaluation of the 
grade (quality) of its common stock.
The grade is based on an analysis of each company's 
financial strength, stability of earnings and record of 
dividend payments. Other considerations include 
conservativeness of capitalization, depth and caliber of 
management, accounting practices, technological capabilities 






These classifications are a measure of suitability to 
an individual investor and should not be construed as advice 
to buy, sell or hold a stock.
Value Line's Common Stock Rankings 
rvalue Line Investment Survey!
Procedure in Building an Efficient Portfolio 
What Value Line Does
(1) Value Line ranks industry groups in order of their 
Timeliness (Relative Performance in the Next 12 Months).
(2) Value Line ranks 1700 (plus) stocks in five categories 
according to their Timeliness (Relative Performance in the 
Next 12 Months1. 100 stocks are ranked 1 (Highest) for
Performance in the Next 12 Months; 300 are ranked 2 (Above 
Average) for Performance in the Next 12 Months; about 900, 3 
(Average); 300, 4 (Below Average); 100, 5 (Lowest).
(3) Value Line rates the 1700 stocks according to their 
Safety also. 150 stocks are rated 1 (Highest) for Safety; 
250 are rated 2 (Above Average); 900 are rated 3 (Average); 
250, 4 (Below Average); and 150 are rated 5 (Lowest) for
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Safety. Stocks rated 1 (Highest) for Safety are those 
expected to be least volatile and their companies 
financially most strong. Stocks rated 5 (Lowest) are 
expected to be the most volatile and their companies least 
strong financially.
(4) Value Line estimates the next 12 months dividend 
yield of each stock at its most recent price. The expected 
yield is noted in the weekly Summary & Index. Value Line 
also shows for comparative purposes the median yield of all 
dividend-paying stocks on the first page of the weekly 
Summary & Index. . . .
Financial Strength Rating
The Value Line Rating of the Company's financial 
strength runs from A++, the very highest, down to C, the 
poorest. Companies ranked B and C++ may be considered to be 
in satisfactory financial condition. Companies rated c for 
Financial Strength have a relatively high incidence of 
default. Financial Strength is averaged with Price 
Stability to make up the Value Line Safety Rank.
Earnings Forecasts and "Surprises"
The Value Line staff estimates earnings per share 
quarter by quarter at least one year ahead. These estimates 
are revised from time to time as evidence requires. The 
very latest 12-month estimates are published weekly in the 
Summary & Index.
Value Line's estimates of next year's earnings and 
earnings 3 to 5 years hence are first published in the third 
quarter of the current year.
However, note that the rank for Timeliness (Price Per­
formance in the next 12 months) is based solely upon 
earnings actually reported, not on Value Line estimates, 
except that when reported earnings differ markedly from 
Value Line estimates, a "surprise" factor is incorporated in 
the Value Line Timeliness Rank.
Financial World Common Stock Rankings 
rFinancial World!
Key to Ratings in 1965 
[Period of Stevenson's Study]
The ratings assigned in the appraisals indicate the 
relative investment quality of each issue. They are not 
meant to be forecasts, or trading recommendations, but
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should be used with other data In evaluating individual 
securities.
A+ and A stocks are investment grade issues which have 
such attributes as a conservative capitalization, consistent 
dividend record and substantial earning power even under the 
most adverse general business conditions. Those in the A+ 
category have shown greater earnings consistency than stocks 
rated A.
B+ and B stocks are upper medium to medium grade issues 
of semi-investment quality. They are fortified by a good 
financial position and satisfactory average earnings.
C+ and C stocks are those in fair to good financial 
position. Earnings of both the semi-speculative C+ and the 
more speculative C-rated issues depend upon general business 
conditions.
D+ and D issues are highly speculative and unsuited for 
the average investor. The D issues are in somewhat more 
marginal position than the D+ category.
NR Not rated.
Banks, Insurance, Investment Companies and Savings and 
Loan Associations are not rated.
Current [1990] Key to Ratios
A+ (superior), A (very high), A- (high), B+ (above 
average), B (average), B- (below average), C (speculative), 
D (poor), NR (not rated) due to incomplete data.
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Appendix C
The Market Model 
[Abdel-khalik and Ajinkya (1979), p. ill]
— a + +  e j t
where RJt = a dependent variable
R^ = an independent variable 
Oj = intercept 
Bj = slope for stock j 
eJt = residual.
And, Bj = [Covariance (Rĵ R,,,) / Variance R|nt].
The Assumptions of the Market Model
(1) Rmt and Rmt_1 are independent observations for any t.
(2) e,t and ejt.j are independent observations for any i.
(3) the mean of ejt over the regression period is zero.
(4) the correlation between the residual term (eJt) and the
market rate of return (R̂ ) is zero.
(5) a and B are unbiased estimators of the true parameters.
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Appendix D
Definition of the Market Adjusted Returns Procedure and 
Empirical Results Using This Procedure for the Following Six 
Groups: Within-Class Upgrades, Across-Class Upgrades, All
Upgrades, Within-Class Downgrades, Across-Class Downgrades,
and All Downgrades.
Market Adjusted Returns
^ f t  -  R it  _
where R|lt is the return on the CRSP equally-weighted 
index for day t.
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Table D.l
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 
is the Standard & Poor's memorandum date.
Within-Class Upgrades, n=117 
Market Adjusted Returns
Event
Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.02 -0.07 0.02
(-40, -31) -0.02 0.87 0.00
(-30, -21) 0.00 -0.39 0.00
(-20, -11) -0.01 -0.32 -0.01
-10 -0.18 -1.57 -0.19
- 9 0.38 2.03* 0.19
- 8 0.02 0.52 0.21
- 7 0.07 0.63 0.28
- 6 0.27 1.21 0.55
- 5 0.15 1.18 0.70
- 4 0.08 0.98 0.78
- 3 0.15 3 .19 0.93
- 2 -0.05 -£ .80 0.88
- 1 0.40 3 .84 1.28
0 1 O N) O -0.71 1.08
1 0.09 0.99 1.17
2 0.22 1.35 1.39
3 -0.29 -1.72 1.10
4 -0.18 -1.06 0.92
5 0.08 0.02 1.00
6 0.33 2.06* 1.33
7 0.00 -0.24 1.33
8 -0.05 -0.70 1.28
9 0.24 1.01 1.52
10 -0.09 -0.56 1.43
(11, 20) 0.03 0.54 1.46
(21, 30) -0.04 -0.81 1.42
(31, 40) -0.08 -1.53 1.34
(41, 50) -0.01 0.09 1.33
♦Significant at a=.05
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Table D.2
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June l, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.04 0.08 0.04
(-40, -31) -0.04 0.05 0.00
(-30, -21) -0.00 -0.64 0.00
(-20, -11) 0.08 1.05 0.08
-10 -0.54 -1.27 -0.46
- 9 0.13 1.21 -0.33
- 8 0.72 1.90 0.39
- 7 0.73 2.63* 1.12
- 6 -0.02 0.15 1.10
- 5 -0.08 0.53 1.02
- 4 0.18 0.57 1.20
- 3 0.71 2.91** 1.91
- 2 1.31 3.83** 3.22
- 1 -0.19 -1.21 3.03
0 -0.52 VOH1 2.51
1 -0.09 -0.75 2.42
2 -0.34 -0.96 2.08
3 -0.11 0.01 1.97
4 -0.24 -1.54 1.73
5 -0.14 -0.57 1.59
6 0.50 1.28 2.09
7 -0.29 -0.37 1.80
8 0.32 1.26 2.12
9 -0.16 -0.26 1.96
10 0.93 2.03* 2.89
(11, 20) 0.01 -0.19 2.90
(21, 30) 0.05 1.06 2.95
(31, 40) -0.12 -2.07* 2.83
(41, 50) 0.02 -0.07 2.85
‘Significant at a=.05 “ Significant at a=.01
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Table D.3
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June l, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 
is the Standard & Poor's memorandum date.
All Upgrades, n=191 
Market Adjusted Returns
Event 
Day (s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) 0.03 0.02 0.03
(-40, -31) -0.03 0.73 0.00
(-30, -21) -0.00 -0.71 0.00
(“20, -11) 0. 03 0.37 0.03
-10 -0.32 -2.02* -0.29
- 9 0.28 2.35* -0.01
- 8 0.29 1.58 0.28
- 7 0.32 2.15* 0.60
- 6 0.16 1.02 0.76
- 5 0.06 1.25 0.82
- 4 0.12 1.14 0.94
- 3 0.37 2.71** 1.31
- 2 0.48 1.73 1.79
- 1 0.18 0.70 1.97
0 -0.32 -1.54 1.65
1 0.02 0.29 1.67
2 0.00 0.49 1.67
3 -0.22 -1.32 1.45
4 -0.21 -1.77 1.24
5 -0.00 -0.34 1.24
6 0.40 2.42** 1.64
7 -0.11 -0.47 1.53
8 0.09 0.26 1.62
9 0.09 0.62 1.71
10 0.30 0.80 2.01
(11, 20) 0.02 0.27 2.03
(21, 30) -0.01 0.00 2.02
(31, 40) -0.09 -2.46* 1.93
(41, 50) -0.00 0.01 1.93
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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Table D.4
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.09 -2.28* -0.09
(-40, -31) -0.02 -0.73 -0.11
(-30, -21) -0.03 -0.88 -0.14
(-20, -11) -0.37 -1.88 -0.21
-10 0.01 1.12 -0.20
- 9 0.13 0.94 -0.07
- 8 0.08 1.01 0.01
- 7 -0.19 -1.67 -0.18
- 6 -0.06 -0.21 -0.24
- 5 -0.23 -2.28* -0.47
- 4 -0.04 1.19 -0.51
- 3 -0.04 -0.16 -0.55
- 2 -0.51 -3.87** -1.06
- 1 -0.45 -3.47** -1.51
0 0.04 -0.21 -1.47
1 0.18 0.74 -1.29
2 0.07 0.85 -1.22
3 0.02 0.82 -1.20
4 -0.07 0.31 -1.27
5 -0.03 -0.53 -1.30
6 0.08 0.63 -1.22
7 0.03 -0.24 -1.19
8 -0.35 -3.13** -1.54
9 -0.00 -1.35 -1.54
10 -0.05 0.20 -1.59
(11, 20) -0.05 -1.79 -1.64(21, 30) 0.02 0.27 -1.62
(31, 40) -0.06 -1.64 -1.68
(41. 50) -0.05 -1.45 -1.73
♦Significant at o=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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Table D.5
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 




Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.05 -0.40 -0.05
(-40, -31) -0.16 -2.44* -0.21
(-30, -21) -0.12 -1.91 -0.33
(-20, -11) -0.10 -1.48 -0.43
-10 0.04 0.57 -0.39
- 9 -0.38 -1.44 -0.77
- 8 -0.11 0.28 -0.88
- 7 0.05 0.13 -0.83
- 6 -0.08 -0.96 -0.91
- 5 -0.26 -1.19 -1.17
- 4 0.05 0.87 -1.12
- 3 -0.16 -1.05 -1.28
- 2 0.05 0.09 -1.23
- 1 -1.03 -3.12** -2.26
0 01 -1.72 -2.70
1 -0.03 0.24 -2.73
2 0.19 0.92 -2.54
3 0.11 0.27 -2.43
4 0.31 0.89 -2.12
5 -0.04 -0.41 -2.16
6 0.18 1.38 -1.98
7 -0.20 -0.58 -2.18
8 0.34 1.16 -1.84
9 0.07 -0.14 -1.77
10 0.12 0.59 -1.65
(11, 20) -0.02 -0.60 -1.67
(21, 30) 0.00 -1.03 -1.67
(31, 40) -0.08 -1.06 -1.75
(41, 50) 0.08 0.81 -1.67
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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Table D.6
Daily average abnormal returns (AAR) in percent and daily 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) in percent for 
companies with the following Standard & Poor's ranking 
change between June 1, 1985 and May 30, 1987. Event day 0 
is the standard & Poor's memorandum date.
All Downgrades, n=582 
Market Adjusted Returns
Event
Day(s) AAR t CAAR
(-50, -41) -0.08 -1.99* -0.08
(-40, -31) -0.07 -1.97* -0.15
(-30, -21) -0.06 -1.99* -0.21
(-20, -11) -0.08 -2.42* -0.29
-10 0.02 1.15 -0.27
- 9 -0.05 0.01 -0.32
- 8 0.01 0.97 -0.31
- 7 -0.11 -1.31 -0.42
- 6 -0.06 -0.61 -0.48
- 5 -0.24 -2.63** -0.72
- 4 -0.01 1.59 -0.73
- 3 -0.08 -0.74 -0.81
- 2 -0.32 -3.01** -1.13
- 1 -0.65 -4.58** -1.78
0 -0.13 -1.18 -1.91
1 0.11 0.73 -1.80
2 0.11 1.23 -1.69
3 0.05 0.92 -1.64
4 0.06 0.79 -1.58
5 -0.04 -0.68 -1.62
6 0.11 1.40 -1.51
7 -0.05 -0.44 -1.56
8 -0.11 -1.75 -1.67
9 0.02 -1.22 -1.65
10 0.01 0.61 -1.64
(11, 20) -0.04 -1.76 -1.68
(21, 30) 0.02 -0.41 -1.66
(31, 40) -0.07 -2.03* -1.73
(41, 50) -0.00 -0.73 -1.73
♦Significant at a=.05 **Significant at a=.01
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ABSTRACT
This study examines the information content of Standard 
& Poor's common stock ranking changes. These rankings are 
derived from a system which begins with a computer-generated 
score for per-share growth, stability, and cyclicality of 
earnings and dividends for the most recent ten years of 
available data. Standard & Poor's then makes adjustments to 
the scores based on firm size, sales volume, "relative 
current standing,'1 and special considerations. The eight 
rankings are as follows: A+ (Highest), A (High), A- (Above
Average), B+ (Average), B (Below Average), B- (Lower), C 
(Lowest), and D (In Reorganization).
Although the rankings are not purported to be buy or 
sell recommendations, they do incorporate information 
provided by standard & Poor's on which investors may base 
investment decisions. Haugen [1979], and Muller, Fielitz, 
and Greene [1983, 1984] find that the rankings are closely 
related to risk, as measured by beta and the standard 
deviation of returns, while the rankings are not a reliable 
measure of return.
Standard & Poor's makes common stock ranking changes 
daily. A ranking change can be either an upgrade, a down­
grade, the initiation of a ranking, or the withdrawal of a 
ranking. The ranking changes are initially revealed by 
Standard & Poor's via internal memoranda. The memoranda are 
released daily to a time-share service which provides the 
information to its customers. The ranking changes are 
subsequently published at the end of the month in the Stock 
Guide.
Daily memoranda for the 1,879 ranking changes from June 
1985 to May 1987 were obtained from Standard & Poor's.
Using the market model, stock prices are found to be fully 
adjusted by day 0, the memorandum date, for both the All 
Upgrades and the All Downgrades portfolios. However, the 
adjustment process differs by type of ranking change. The 
results from a Wall Street Journal Index search indicate 
that Standard & Poor's changes rankings following earnings 
announcements. While no relation is found between rankings 
and return, a close relation is found between rankings and 
risk, both before and after a ranking change. Also, a 
statistically significant fall in the mean beta for the All 
Upgrades portfolio is found following the memorandum date. 
Thus, firms upgraded by Standard & Poor's are found to have 
less risk in the post-event period than in the pre-event 
period.
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